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Abstract: Values are incommensurable when they cannot be mea-
sured on a single cardinal scale. Many philosophers suggest that
incommensurability can help us solve the problems of population
ethics. I agree. But some philosophers claim that populations bear
incommensurable values merely because they contain different
numbers of people, perhaps within some range. I argue that mere
differences in how many people exist, even within some range, do not
suffice for incommensurability. I argue that the intuitive neutrality
of creating happy people is better captured by a version of average
utilitarianism. But this view is problematic. So I suggest a version of
total utilitarianism that avoids the repugnant conclusion by appealing




1 Parity and Mere Addition 7
1.1 Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Critical-Band Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Arbitrariness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.1 The Tradeoff Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.2 Rabinowicz’s Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4 Vagueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4.1 Counterexamples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4.2 Multidimensional Vagueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2 Incomparability and Average Utilitarianism 41
2.1 Bader’s View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Deontic Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Balancing vs. Averaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3.1 Sums of Wellbeing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3.2 Infinite Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.3 Foundations of Average Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 The Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3
3 Total Utilitarianism without Repugnance 79
3.1 Two Lexical Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.1.1 Single-Life Repugnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.1.2 Repugnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2 The Lexical Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.2.1 Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.2.2 Marginal Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108





This thesis is about a family of views in population ethics. I am interested in views
that appeal to incommensurability. Values are incommensurable when they cannot
be measured on a single cardinal scale. My question is whether incommensurabil-
ity can help us solve the problems of population ethics—most importantly, the
problem of avoiding
The Repugnant Conclusion: For any population of excellent lives, there is some
much larger population of people whose existence would be better, even
though their lives would be barely worth living.1
Why might we be unable to measure the values of populations on a single cardinal
scale? I consider three views.
Chapter 1 is about a view inspired by Parfit and developed by Blackorby, Bossert,
and Donaldson (1996), Qizilbash (2007), and Rabinowicz (2009). This view says
that adding people whose wellbeing is within some limited range makes things
neither better nor worse, nor equally good. It results in what Chang (2002) calls
parity. I discuss two objections to this view, raised by Broome (2004). I argue that
one of Broome’s objections succeeds, but that the other fails in a way that spells
trouble for Broome’s own view.
Chapter 2 is about a radical proposal that avoids Broome’s objections. Bader
(manuscript) argues that different-sized populations are incomparable. I present
1See (Parfit 1984, 388).
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two objections to Bader’s theory and argue that they are best avoided by average
utilitarianism.2 Philosophers tend not to take average utilitarianism seriously. But
I argue that we can revise average utilitarianism in a natural way to capture the
intuitive neutrality of creating happy people, by appealing to some incomparability.
I find the resulting theory problematic, but still worth taking seriously.
In Chapter 3, I discuss a different kind of incommensurability: lexical superiority.
One good is lexically superior to another if some amount of the one is better than
any amount of the other. I discuss Parfit’s (2004) lexical view, which he calls per-
fectionism, on which the loss of the best things in life cannot be outweighed by any
improvements in wellbeing. I suggest a different lexical view, called lexical total
utilitarianism, on which no population of people whose lives are all barely worth
living could contain a greater sum of wellbeing than any population of excellent
lives. I then argue that lexical total utilitarians should appeal to parity, in a way
that avoids Broome’s objections.
I draw two conclusions. The first conclusion is negative: incommensurability in
population ethics is not plausibly explained by mere differences in population size.
The second conclusion is positive: we can avoid the repugnant conclusion by ap-
pealing to incommensurable dimensions of wellbeing.
2I use “utilitarian” to refer only to the axiology, not to the conjunction of the axiology and con-
sequentialism.
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1 Parity and Mere Addition
The views that I discuss are best understood as different responses to Parfit’s mere
addition paradox. Here is one version of the paradox:
A = (100,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω),
A+ = (100, 1, 1, . . . , 1),
Z = (2, 2, 2, . . . , 2)
These lists represent distributions of wellbeing. The numbers represent how good
people’s lives are. Level 100 for any person, for example, is a hundred times better
than level 1 for any other person. All positive numbers represent lives that are
worth living. I use Ω to indicate that a person has no life, and so no quality of life,
in a distribution. The ellipses indicate that many other people exist at the relevant
level.
For this example, imagine that each component in the list represents the welfare
of ten billion people. In A, there are ten billion people with excellent lives. In A+,
these same people’s lives are just as good, and many more people exist with lives
that are barely worth living. How many more people? Enough so that A+’s average
wellbeing is less than 2. In Z, wellbeing is uniformly distributed so that every life
is twice as good as the mediocre lives in A+.
The paradox consists in these claims:
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(1) A+ is at least as good as A.
(2) Z is better than A+.
(3) Z is not better than A.
These claims are inconsistent. If Z is better than A+, which is at least as good as A,
then Z must be better than A.3
Each claim seems highly plausible. (1) is supported by
TheMere Addition Principle: “For any population [A], if one adds any number
of people with positive welfare to create a new population [A+], without af-
fecting the [A]-people’s welfare, then [A+] is at least as good as [A]” (Carlson
1998, 285).
And (2) is supported by
Non-Anti-Egalitarianism: “A population with perfect equality is better than a
population with the same number of people, inequality, and lower average
(and thus lower total) welfare” (Arrhenius 2000, 253).
If we accept themere addition principle and non-anti-egalitarianism, thenwemust
deny (3).4 But if the lives inA are excellent, and the lives inZ are barelyworth living,
then this seems repugnant.
3I assume throughout that at least as good as is transitive and reflexive, and that better than is
the asymmetric part of this relation. These assumptions are sufficient for the inference to be good
(Sen 1970a, 10).
4See also Ng (1989) for both principles.
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Parfit (1984, 431) suggests a response to the mere addition principle. He suggests
thatA+ is not worse thanA, but that not worse than doesn’t imply at least as good as.
This chapter is about a theory inspired by Parfit’s suggestion, called critical-band
utilitarianism. The chapter comes in four sections. Section 1.1 introduces some
concepts needed formaking sense of Parfit’s suggestion, alongwith related concepts
that I use throughout the thesis. Section 1.2 introduces critical-band utilitarianism.
Section 1.3 discusses Broome’s objection that critical-band utilitarianism is ad hoc:
I agree. Section 1.4 discusses Broome’s objection that critical-band utilitarianism
is incompatible with vagueness: I disagree, and I think Broome’s own view is ad
hoc too.
1.1 Concepts
Parfit’s suggestion that A+ is neither worse than nor at least as good as A violates
TheCompleteness of At Least as Good As: For any distributions A and B, either
A is at least as good as B, or B is at least as good as A.
Or, equivalently, A is either better than, worse than, or just as good as B. I use “in-
completeness” to refer to violations of the completeness of at least as good as—i.e.,
cases in which neither of two things is at least as good as the other. In this section,
I define two kinds of incompleteness—incomparability and imprecise equality—
along with incommensurability.
Why might A+ be neither worse than nor at least as good as A?
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On one view, A and A+ are incomparable. My height, for example, is incomparable
with your intelligence: I am neither taller, shorter, nor as tall as you are intelligent.
I discuss the view that mere addition results in incomparability in the next chapter.
But this is not Parfit’s suggestion. Comparability is, I assume, transitive.5 Parfit
thinks that Z is worse than A. But if A+ is comparable with (because worse than)
Z, and Z is comparable with (because worse than) A, then A+must be comparable
with A.
Parfit’s suggestion is that A and A+ are imprecisely equally good. For example, Ein-
stein and Bach might have been imprecisely equally great geniuses: neither was a
greater genius than the other, nor were they equally great with respect to genius. If
they were equally great with respect to genius, than a slightly improved version of
Bach (e.g., who finishes The Art of the Fugue) would’ve been a greater genius than
Einstein. But they weren’t incomparable with respect to genius, because Einstein
was a greater genius than some musical geniuses, and Bach was a greater genius
than some scientific geniuses. They were comparable with respect to genius, but
only imprecisely so.
Instead of “imprecise equality,” Chang (2002) uses “parity”: she says that some val-
ues are on a par. I use these expressions interchangeably.
Incomparability and parity both involve failures of completeness. How do they
relate to incommensurability?
Incommensurability is a relation between values, but “values” can refer either to
5This assumption is not usually made. But it makes it easier for me to distinguish incomparabil-
ity from parity, discussed below. Chang (2002) distinguishes them by appealing to positive versus
negative value relations.
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objects’ degrees of value (i.e., how good they are) or to their dimensions of value
(i.e., the ways or respects in which they are valuable). The relation between de-
grees and dimensions is one of determinate to determinable. Height, for example,
is a dimension along which people and other things vary. Your particular height
is a determinate of this determinable. Similarly, 3 grams is a determinate of the
determinable mass. I use “values” only to refer to the determinates, not to their
determinables, unless otherwise specified. When some determinable property F
has some ordinal structure—i.e., when some things are Fer than others—I call F a
dimension.
I use Chang’s (2013) definition of incommensurability: “Two values, such as plea-
sure and fairness, are incommensurable if there is no cardinal scale of value ac-
cording to which both can be measured” (2595). Chang’s examples of pleasure and
fairness suggests that she understands incommensurability as a relation between
dimensions, rather than degrees, of value. That is how I, too, shall understand in-
commensurability.
I define a scale as a set of scalar values. A value is scalar iff it can be represented by a
single real number (e.g., 3 grams). A cardinal scale is one that preserves meaning-
ful differences between values: it allows us to say that A is Fer than B by more than
C is Fer than D. Two dimensions F and G are incommensurable iff the difference
between some quantity of F and some quantity of G is not a scalar value. For ex-
ample, the difference between my height and your intelligence is not a scalar value:
it is undefined, so they are incomparable. And the difference between Einstein’s
intelligence and Bach’s intelligence is, plausibly, not a scalar value: the values are
too imprecisely comparable to be represented by real numbers. But the difference
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between my height and the width of my toe is a scalar value: it is some real number
of centimeters. Height and width are commensurable because they can be mea-
sured on the same cardinal scale. Height and intelligence are incommensurable
because they cannot be measured on the same ordinal scale, let alone a cardinal
one. Different kinds of intelligence are, plausibly, incommensurable because they
cannot be measured on a single cardinal scale.
What is the relation between incommensurability and incompleteness?
First, incompleteness (due to either incomparability or parity) requires incommen-
surability. If A is not better than, worse than, or just as good as B, then the evalu-
ative difference between them cannot be represented by a single real number. For
then it would be either positive (better), negative (worse), or zero (equally good).
But if we cannot represent the evaluative difference between A and B with a real
number, then we cannot measure their values on a single cardinal scale.
Second, incommensurability is more general than incompleteness. In Chapter 3,
I discuss lexical superiority. Like Ross (2002, 150) and Laird (1936, 255), I un-
derstand lexical superiority as a relation between incommensurable dimensions of
value. If theAs are lexically superior to the Bs, then we cannot represent the evalua-
tive difference between them with a single real number. They cannot fit on a single
cardinal scale. (I explain this in more detail in Chapter 3.) But lexical superiority
need not violate completeness. Whereas parity involves imprecise comparability,
lexical superiority involves emphatic comparability (Chang 2014, 116).
I have defined incompleteness, incomparability, parity, and incommensurability.
Now back to population ethics.
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1.2 Critical-Band Utilitarianism
Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005) try to develop Parfit’s suggestion that
A+ is not worse than, nor at least as good as, A. They suggest an interval of non-
negative critical levels, such that the addition of lives within the interval makes the
world neither better nor worse, all things considered, nor precisely equally as good.
According to Qizilbash (2007) and Rabinowicz (2009), adding such lives results in
parity. More specifically, according to
Critical-Band Utilitarianism: One distribution is at least as good as another iff
its critical-level-adjusted sum of wellbeing is at least as great for every level
in the interval. That is, for any distributions A and B whose welfare levels are










where C is the set of critical levels.
Suppose the critical band extends from 0 to 5, so that the extra lives in the mere
addition paradox are within the interval. Critical-band utilitarianism therefore de-
nies the mere addition principle stated on page 8: A+ not, on this view, at least
as good as A. This is because, for some critical levels (namely, those above 1), A+
is not at least as good as A. Critical-band utilitarianism can avoid the repugnant
conclusion because, according to any critical level at least as great as the Z-people’s
wellbeing, Z is not better than A.6
6Critical-band utilitarianism also avoids what Parfit (manuscript) calls the callous conclusion,
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This theory’s incompleteness is best understood as parity, rather than incompara-
bility, because the interval is bounded. If we interpreted it as incomparability, then
comparability would become intransitive. For example,
B = (100,Ω)
C = (100, 100)
D = (100, 1)
D is comparable with (because worse than) C, which is comparable with (because
better than) B. But neither of B and D is at least as good as the other, according
to critical-band utilitarianism. So the incompleteness cannot be incomparability if
comparability is transitive. It is best understood as parity.7
Critical-band utilitarianism, however, implies
TheWeak Repugnant Conclusion: For any number of excellent lives, there is
some larger number of mediocre lives whose existence would not be worse.
This is because, according to some critical level within the interval (namely, any
level below the Z-people), A is not better than Z. This could be avoided if some pos-
itive welfare levels, including the Z-people’s, were below the interval’s lower bound.
on which adding a life towards the bottom of the band isn’t worse than adding a better life. Critical-
band utilitarianism avoids this because, for any critical level, the critical-level-adjusted sum of well-
being would be greater if we add the better life rather than the worse one. But adding either life
would be neither better nor worse than adding no life at all.
7Rabinowicz and Qizilbash provide other reasons to interpret the incompleteness as parity.
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Suppose, for example, that the interval’s lower bound is 3. On this view, A is better
than Z because the Z-people fall below the critical band, so they contribute only
negative value. But the view would then imply
The Sadistic Conclusion: When adding people without affecting the original peo-
ple’s welfare, it can be better to add people with negative welfare rather than
positive welfare. (Arrhenius 2000)
For example, if the interval’s lower bound is 3, then A+ becomes worse than
E = (100,−1,Ω, . . . ,Ω).
Critical-band utilitarianism can avoid the sadistic conclusion if the interval extends
down to 0. But it nonetheless implies
TheWeak Sadistic Conclusion: When adding people without affecting the origi-
nal people’s welfare, it is not always worse to add people with negative welfare
rather than positive welfare.
This is because, whenever many people would have positive welfare below some
critical level in the interval, it might not be worse, according to that critical level,
to add fewer people with negative welfare. So, for some critical level, the sum of
critical-level-adjusted wellbeing may be greater in the population of lives that are
worth not living.
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The weak repugnant and sadistic conclusions are two problems for critical-band
utilitarianism. Broome raises further objections to the theory, which raise more
general questions about incommensurability in population ethics.
1.3 Arbitrariness
Broome’s (2004) first objection to critical-bandutilitarianism is that the theory is ad
hoc. Why should we expect mere addition to yield parity? Themost plausible cases
of parity involve tradeoffs between incommensurable dimensions of value. Broome
considers Sartre’s student, who had to choose between fighting in the SecondWorld
War and staying home to care for his mother. Many find it plausible that neither
of the student’s options is at least as good as the other, because there are multiple
ideals at stake: he has reasons of honor and patriotism to fight in the war, and
reasons of love and care to stay home. He has to weigh these conflicting ideals,
but their weights seem imprecise. Even if there were a precise amount by which
fighting in the war is better with respect to honor and a precise amount by which
staying home is better with respect to love, there could be no precise amount by
which honor is more or less important than love. This makes it plausible that the
options are on a par. The parity seems best explained by the imprecise weights of
the incommensurable dimensions of value. But, Broome writes,
our case is not at all like Sartre’s. We are not dealing with differing
values. One option has a different number of people from the other.
Whatever the value of people might be, each option realizes that value;
one simply realizes a greater quantity of it than the other. (168)
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By “the value of people,” Broomemeans the value of lives worth living, or of wellbe-
ing. Broome’s point is that critical-band utilitarianism does not identify a conflict
between dimensions of value, and that without such a conflict, we have no reason
to expect parity.
In Section 1.3.1, I defend Broome’s diagnosis of parity against some objections due
to Parfit. In Section 1.3.2, I respond to Rabinowicz’s attempt to make critical-band
utilitarianism less arbitrary.
1.3.1 The Tradeoff Constraint
Broome’s diagnosis is that parity is explained by conflicts between incommensu-
rable dimensions of value. This diagnosis can be generalized beyond imprecise
equality in the goodness of outcomes. Consider which of two people is healthier,
more creative, more intelligent, nicer, lazier, or more beautiful. These relations,
which Chang (2002) calls covering considerations, depend on multiple respects or
criteria, which I have been calling dimensions. Things and people can be good, cre-
ative, healthy, intelligent, nice, lazy, or beautiful in some respects and not in others.
These covering considerations are multidimensional. When there are conflicts be-
tween these dimensions, we may get failures of completeness, because the dimen-
sions cannot be precisely weighed against each other. Something like this view
has been suggested by many philosophers,8 economists,9 and linguists.10 Chang
(2002, 679), too, characterizes her cases of parity as conflicts between imprecisely
8See Laird (1936, 255f.), Rashdall (1902, 155–6), Schoenfield (2012, 37), and Rabinowicz (2012,
134, 158).
9See Sen (1997), Eliaz and Ok (2006), Ok (2002), von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007, 29).
10See Sassoon (2013a, 385), Klein (1980, 22), and Kamp and Sassoon (2015).
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weighted aspects of a covering consideration (although she does not say that these
are the only possible cases).
This suggests the following desideratum:
The Tradeoff Constraint: If A and B are on a par, then there is some way in which
A is better than B and some way in which B is better than A.
Critical-band utilitarianism violates this constraint because adding good lives
seems not to make things in any way worse. Critical-band utilitarians might object
that each critical level within the band is a dimension of population goodness. On
this view, A+ is better than A in some respects and worse in others, because it
is better according to some critical levels and worse according to others. So A+
and A may be on a par. But this claim is ad hoc. Being better according to some
critical level doesn’t seem like a way of being better any more than being a better
president according to some pundit is a way of being a better president.
Some might try to justify the appeal to parity by identifying conflicting ideals in
cases of mere addition. Some pluralists believe that mere addition makes things in
some way better—e.g., with respect to total wellbeing—and in other ways worse—
e.g., with respect to inequality.11 Such conflicts might generate parity. If we ac-
cept that these are ways in which populations can be better or worse, then we can
reconcile the parity of mere addition with the tradeoff constraint.12 But this view
is very different from critical-band utilitarianism. Critical-band utilitarianism ap-
peals only to the sumof (critical-level-adjusted)wellbeing. Inequality andother im-
11See Temkin (2012) and Carter (1999).
12See Goodrich (2014).
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personal ideals are simply irrelevant to critical-band utilitarianism: critical-band
utilitarianism predicts cases of parity even when there’s no inequality and the uni-
versal level of wellbeing is increased. Appealing to such ideals would be a different
theory with a different structure. Such a theory might be plausible, but I am not
confident that the plurality of ideals needed to give plausible results in population
ethics can be integrated in a systematic way. So I do not pursue that option here.
The tradeoff constraint doesn’t apply to incomparability. For example, I am neither
taller, shorter, nor as tall as you are intelligent, but that’s not because I am in some
ways taller and in other ways shorter than you are intelligent: degrees of height
and of intelligence are incomparable. Moreover, I am neither better nor worse nor
just as well off as
√
2. But this isn’t because
√
2 is well off in a different way than
I am. It’s because
√
2 doesn’t have a degree of wellbeing. These cases do not in-
volve tradeoffs between imprecisely weighted dimensions of value. In the case of
√
2, we are comparing items along a dimension that one item doesn’t instantiate:
it has no determinate of that determinable. When comparing my height and your
intelligence, however, we have values, but they are determinates of determinables
that share no ordinal structure or scale. Comparing them is like asking, “Which
is greater: crimson or 4 grams?” Incomparability is not explained by tradeoffs be-
tween dimensions of value.
Parfit raises two objections to the tradeoff constraint.13 First, he suggests that trade-
offs are not required for imprecise comparability, and so they may not be required
for imprecise equality. I agree that tradeoffs may not be necessary for imprecise
comparability, but imprecise comparability is compatible with completeness. Sup-
13In correspondence.
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pose, for example, that wellbeing is just a function of how much money one has,
measured in some privileged currency. More specifically, suppose that wellbeing
is a strictly increasing function of money, and only money. And suppose further
that money has diminishing marginal contributions to wellbeing. If the factor by
which money’s marginal contribution to wellbeing diminishes is imprecise, then it
may be imprecise how much better one amount of money is than another. There
we have imprecise comparability.
Crucially, however, although the imprecise weight of marginal differences in
money with respect to wellbeing can generate imprecise comparability, it cannot
generate imprecise equality. This is because, for any two amounts of money in
some currency, one is either greater than the other or they are precisely equal. If
they are precisely equal, then they are precisely equally good. If one is greater than
the other, then one may be imprecisely better than the other. But there is no room
for imprecise equality. That is how imprecise weights can generate imprecise com-
parability along a single dimension without generating imprecise equality. This
doesn’t entail the tradeoff constraint. But it shows that imprecise comparability is
not sufficient for imprecise equality. We also need multidimensionality.
Second, Parfit objects that A and B might be on a par because they are good in
different ways, without each being better in some way and worse in another. On
Parfit’s view, the imprecise equality of Einstein and Bach with respect to genius is
not grounded in the fact that Einstein was a greater genius in some ways and a
lesser genius in others. Rather, it is grounded in the fact that they are geniuses of
such different kinds. Whereas the tradeoff constraint focuses on the different ways
in which A is better than B and B is better than A, Parfit’s suggestion focuses on the
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different ways in which A is good and B is good.
Consider an analogy. We can apply multidimensional adjectives to many different
kinds of entities. For example, we can apply healthy to to human, girl, cat, plant,
savings account, and policy. The kind of entity to which an adjective is applied deter-
mines the relevant dimensions. The dimensions that are relevant to the health of a
savings account are very different from those for a cat. This may be true, in general,
for distinct determinates of a determinable. For example, there is some overlap in
the criteria for the health of animals, but the criteria for donkey health are differ-
ent from the criteria for human health. Asking whether Einstein is a greater genius
thanBachmay be relevantly like askingwhether I amhealthier than a donkey. Ifmy
donkey Morton is diseased and I am functioning normally, I am plausibly health-
ier than Morton. But, after curing Morton, it may be true that neither of us is at
least as healthy as the other—not because I am in some ways healthier, and in other
ways sicker, than Morton, but rather because human health is very different from
donkey health.
On the surface, the questions are these:
(1) Was Einstein a greater genius than Bach?
(2) Am I healthier than Morton?
But perhaps we really mean,
(3) Was Einstein a greater scientific genius than Bach was a musical genius?
(4) Am I healthier for a human than Morton is for a donkey?
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We might call comparisons like (3) and (4) interdimensional, to emphasize the
parallel with what linguists call interadjective comparisons. Intuitively, they in-
volve imprecise comparability, rather than incomparability, because Einstein was
a greater genius than somemusical geniuses and I am healthier than some donkeys.
Interdimensional imprecision may also arise in more familiar contexts. Compare
the frisson one sometimes experiences in response to music with the pleasure of
knowing that one has solved a challenging and important puzzle. Experiences of
these different kinds may in some cases be imprecisely equally pleasurable, not be-
cause each is more pleasurable than the other along some dimension, but rather
because they are pleasures of different kinds. Or consider aesthetic comparisons:
some landscapes are more beautiful than some paintings, which are more beau-
tiful than some sculptures. The dimensions of beauty here are arguably distinct.
This may generate imprecision when comparing the beauty of different kinds of
things. And consider interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing: some outcomes are
better for some people than they are for others. But even if we could make precise
comparisons with respect to a single person’s wellbeing, some doubt that different
people’s wellbeing levels are precisely comparable (Sen 1970b).14
I am not claiming that there is interdimensional imprecision. I am merely suggest-
ing this as a way of developing Parfit’s alternative to tradeoff-based imprecision.
But I now wish to claim that the imprecision predicted by critical-band utilitari-
anism seems not to be justified on interdimensional grounds either: what are the
different dimensions along which the relevant distributions are good?
14van Rooij (2011) points out the analogy between interadjective comparisons and interpersonal
comparisons of wellbeing
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I already dismissed two answers to this question as ad hoc or inconsistent with
critical-band utilitarianism: different critical levels and different impersonal ide-
als (e.g., total wellbeing and inequality). But two more answers naturally suggest
themselves. One answer is that the distributions are good for different people. The
problem with this suggestion is that it predicts imprecision in the following case:
A = (4,Ω)
B = (Ω, 4)
Intuitively, these are equally good. We are now considering the view that they are
instead on a par.
This view, however, faces the nonidentity problem (Parfit 1984, 359). Suppose we
slightly improve the welfare of the second person in B:
A = (4,Ω)
B′ = (Ω, 5)
Intuitively, B′ is better and is what we ought to choose. But this makes it unlikely
that A and B were on a par. A distinctive feature of parity is insensitivity to small
improvements: a slightly improved Bach may be a greater genius than Bach, but
not a greater genius than Einstein. We have slightly improved B, but the resulting
B′ is better than A. If anything better than B, by however little, is better than A,
then A and B are not on a par. They are equally good (Broome 2004, 21).
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A different kind of interdimensional imprecision has to do with different numbers
of people. Parfit has suggested that distributions containing different numbers of
people are only imprecisely comparable.15 He suggests that adding people creates a
margin of imprecision. Unless an extra person’s life would be sufficiently good, the
value of her life is “swallowed up” (Broome 2004, 170) by themargin of imprecision,
which results in imprecise equality. This might justify something like critical-band
utilitarianism.
It is not clear, however, why populations of different sizes should be imprecisely
comparable. It doesn’t seem like interdimensional imprecision, because being
good for 100 people and being good for 1000 people don’t seem like different ways
of being good. Moreover, if different-sized populations are less precisely compa-
rable by some margin, then this shouldn’t depend on how good people’s lives are:
the goodness of a life can overcome or be swallowed up by the imprecision, but it
shouldn’t affect the presence or magnitude of imprecision. So there ought to be




My objection is that, if every additional life creates a margin of imprecision that
must be overcome, then D is not worse than C. But D is worse than C. So not
15In previous versions of Parfit (manuscript). He has since dropped this claim, partly in response
to these arguments.
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every additional life creates a margin of imprecision that must be overcome. Parfit
might respond that the second life in D does create a margin of imprecision, but
the badness of her life overcomes thismargin, and that this is true for any life worth
not living. But if the disvalue of a bad life, however small, is enough to overcome
the margin of imprecision, then why isn’t the value of a good life always enough
to do so? Alternatively, Parfit might respond that bad lives do not create a margin
of imprecision. But this makes it even more arbitrary to claim that populations
containing different numbers of people are less precisely comparable.
There is a more extreme version of this view. Bader’s view says that populations
containing different numbers of people are not even imprecisely comparable: they
are incomparable. I discuss this view in Chapter 2.
I conclude that although there may be interdimensional, non-tradeoff-based im-
precision, this source of imprecision is not helpful to critical-band utilitarianism.
1.3.2 Rabinowicz’s Responses
Rabinowicz (2009, 405) tries to meet Broome’s arbitrariness objection by drawing
on his (2008) definition of parity. On this definition, two outcomes are on a par iff
it is permissible to prefer either outcome to the other. Rabinowicz then claims that
the parity of mere addition is explained by the permissibility of preferring either
the larger population or the smaller population to the other. But why it is permis-
sible to prefer either world to the other? One plausible reason why it might be
permissible to prefer either of two outcomes to the other is that one has some rea-
son to have each preference, and neither set of reasons outweighs the other. That
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is how Rabinowicz himself characterizes parity at times (2012, 134, 158). But there
appears to be no conflict in the balance of reasons in cases of mere addition: what
reason do we have to prefer the smaller distribution to the larger one? Rabinowicz
claims that the permissible preference orderings “correspond to different choices
of subintervals within the neutral range” (2009, 405). But this is a merely formal
point: Rabinowicz does not explain whatmakes these different choices permissible.
So Broome’s request for an explanation has not been met.
Rabinowicz (2009, 406) suggests another way of meeting the arbitrariness objec-
tion. He suggests that the critical band can be interpreted as a personal neutral
range—i.e., a range such that a person’s existence within the range is neither better
nor worse for her than nonexistence. Life above this range is better for the person
than nonexistence and, therefore, worth living; life below it is worse for the person
than nonexistence and, therefore, worth not living. Adding lives worth living al-
ways makes things better, and adding lives worth not living always makes things
worse. Adding lives that are neither worth living nor worth not living—i.e., in the
personal neutral range—makes things neither better nor worse, nor equally good.
This view is formally just like critical-band utilitarianism, but it reinterprets the
band’s lower bound as the point below which life is worse than nonexistence and
the upper bound as the point above which life is better than nonexistence.
This interpretation of the critical band could explain why the addition of lives
within the band results in parity: the lives themselves are neither better than, worse
than, nor as good as nonexistence. But Broome’s request for an explanation could
arise there too. Why think that some lives are not better than, worse than, or just
as good as nonexistence? The most natural reason to think this is because lives are
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incomparable in personal value with nonexistence: nonexistence has no personal
value, in the same way that
√
2 has no height or color. That is not ad hoc. However,
this would make comparability intransitive. Nonexistence is comparable with (be-
cause better than) lives below the band, which are comparable with (because worse
than) lives within the band. So the transitivity of comparability requires nonexis-
tence to be comparable with lives within the band, contrary to the suggestion we
are considering.
Rabinowicz’s view is instead, I think, thatmany lives are on a par with nonexistence.
This might seem arbitrary. But there may be a good justification for it. On Rabi-
nowicz’s view, a life is on a par with nonexistence iff it is permissible to prefer either
the life or nonexistence for the person’s sake. Thismost plausibly obtainswhen lives
contain both good things and bad things. There may be no single quantity of hap-
piness, for example, that precisely compensates for any quantity of suffering. This
is incoherent on some views about quantities of happiness and quantities of suffer-
ing, on which such quantities are defined only as values on the same cardinal scale
of wellbeing (Griffin 1979). But if we understand such quantities independently of
evaluative comparisons, we might wonder how much happiness is needed to com-
pensate for some quantity of suffering. According to psychologists Fredrickson
and Losada (2005), the answer is 2.9013. That is their “critical positivity ratio” that
separates “flourishing” from “languishing” lives. But that’s absurd. If the question
even makes sense, the answer is not some real number. Rabinowicz might say that
there is a range of permissible tradeoff ratios between goods and bads, such that
some lives are better than nonexistence according to some tradeoff ratios but not
according to others. This might explain why such lives are on a par with nonexis-
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tence.
Rabinowicz claims that his view avoids the repugnant conclusion. But it doesn’t. A
life that is barely worth living is one that, on this view, is barely better for the per-
son than nonexistence. Rabinowicz’s view entails that, for any number of excellent
lives, there is some larger number of people whose existence would be better, even
though their lives are barely better for them than their nonexistence. Rabinowicz
might be understanding the repugnant conclusion differently—e.g., as the claim
that, for any number of excellent lives, there is some much larger number of peo-
ple whose existence would be better, even though their lives would barely be better
than lives that are worth not living (406).16 Rabinowicz avoids this conclusion be-
cause he thinks that lives worth living cannot be barely better than lives worth not
living: such lives are separated by the critical band, which is wide enough that no
lives above it are just barely better than lives below it.
This claim’s plausibility, however, depends on why certain lives are merely on a
par with nonexistence. Consider a psychologically simple creature—e.g., a lizard—
whose life contains only good things. It might contain, for example, a stream of
mild pleasure for two minutes. This life seems to me barely worth living, and in-
deed barely better than a life that contains a stream of mild discomfort for two
minutes. That some number of positive lizard lives could be better than some num-
ber of excellent lives strikes me as repugnant. To avoid this repugnant conclusion,
Rabinowicz would have to claim that the happy lizards’ lives are not worth living:
they are on a par with nonexistence. But if we explain the parity of some lives
with nonexistence by appealing to permissible tradeoffs between good things and
16But see his standard statement of the repugnant conclusion on p. 398.
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bad things, we cannot say that the lives in question are on a par with nonexistence:
they contain no bad things. Rabinowicz might say that such lives are in some ways
bad—e.g., because they are boring. On this view, it may be permissible to prefer
nonexistence to a lizard life of good feelings for this creature’s own sake, because
it is so boring. But why? Nonexistence isn’t any more exciting. Alternatively, Ra-
binowicz could reject the tradeoff constraint, in which case Broome’s arbitrariness
objection rears it head again. We would need some explanation of why it is permis-
sible to prefer nonexistence to amildly happy life for the being’s own sake. Without
such an explanation, Rabinowicz’s interpretation makes little progress.
Moreover, in addition to implying the standard repugnant conclusion, Rabinow-
icz’s view implies other counterintuitive conclusions. We saw on pages 14–15 that
critical-band utilitarianism implies weak versions of the repugnant and sadistic
conclusions. Rabinowicz’s view simply reinterprets those, but in ways that are even
less plausible. Its analogue of the weak repugnant conclusion is that, for any num-
ber of excellent lives, there is some much larger number of people whose existence
would not be worse, even though none of their lives would be worth living. (It im-
plies this because lives within the band are not, for Rabinowicz, worth living.) Its
analogue of theweak sadistic conclusion is that, when adding people without affect-
ing the original people’s welfare, it is not always worse to add people whose lives
are much worse than nonexistence rather than people whose lives are not worse
than nonexistence. (It implies this because lives within the band are not worse
than nonexistence.) Rabinowicz’s personal neutral range may help to avoid the ar-
bitrariness objection and an idiosyncratic version of the repugnant conclusion, but
it implies the standard repugnant conclusion and other implausible conclusions.
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I conclude that Broome’s arbitrariness objection succeeds. I now turn to Broome’s
vagueness objection, which I think fails.
1.4 Vagueness
Broome argues that parity is incompatible with vagueness. Completeness asserts a
disjunction (stated on page 9), and parity implies that the disjuncts are false: A is
neither better than, worse than, nor just as good as B. Broome, by contrast, accepts
the disjunction that A is better than, worse than, or as good as B. But he thinks it’s
often vague which disjunct holds.
Broome claims that better is obviously vague. And critical-band utilitarianism
should predict some vagueness: the upper bound of the critical band, for exam-
ple, is vague. It would be hard to believe that adding any life of some quality results
in parity, but that adding any slightly better life makes things better. Say that a life
is borderline if it is vague whether the life is within the critical band or above it. It’s
vaguewhether adding a borderline lifemakes things better ormerely imprecisely as
good. But, according to critical-band utilitarianism, it’s determinate that adding a
borderline life doesn’t make things worse. Broome claims that this combination—
that adding the life would determinately not make things worse, but that it’s vague
whether it makes things better—is impossible.
This claim follows from his
Collapsing Principle: “For any predicate F and any things A and B, if we can deny
that B is Fer than A, but we cannot deny that A is Fer than B, then A is Fer
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than B” (2004, 174).
Let’s apply the collapsing principle to critical-band utilitarianism. Let A be a pop-
ulation with the borderline life, and let B be that same population without this
life. The critical-band utilitarian denies that B is better than A. And he refuses to
deny that A is better than B, because it’s vague whether the life is above the criti-
cal band. But, in violation of the collapsing principle, he refuses to assert that A is
better than B. Because critical-band utilitarianism violates the collapsing principle,
Broome concludes that it is false, and indeed that any appeal to incompleteness is
incompatible with the vagueness of better.
Broome’s alternative theory is formally just like critical-band utilitarianism, except
he interprets the critical band as a zone of vagueness. There is, on Broome’s view,
a single critical level, but it’s vague which level it is. One distribution is at least as
good another iff it’s at least as good according to every admissible precisification of
the critical level. Suppose that all levels from 0 to 5 are admissible precisifications
of the critical level. This means, in the mere addition paradox, that A+ is either
better than, worse than, or just as good as A, but we cannot say which.
In Section 1.4.1, I argue that the collapsing principle is false. In Section 1.4.2, I
challenge Broome’s assumption that better is obviously vague. I argue that it is vague
only if it is multidimensional, and that this is bad news for Broome’s own theory.
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1.4.1 Counterexamples
In this section, I present new counterexamples to the collapsing principle. My goal
here is to show that the principle is threatened from many different angles, so I aim
for breadth rather than depth.
Consider first absolute adjectives, such as flat, certain, or empty. Suppose we can
assert, in some context, that some table is flat. We can deny, within that context,
that the pavement is flatter than the table: if x is flat (within a context), then y isn’t
flatter than x (within that context). But it might be vague whether the pavement is
flat. And so we may be unable to assert that the table is flatter than the pavement.
But we can deny that the pavement is flatter than the table, because the table is flat.
Consider next phenomenal predicates, such as painful. I cannot tell whether some
sensation is painful. The sensation becomes slightly more intense: if the first was
painful, then the second was more so. But I can’t tell whether the second was more
painful, because it might not have been painful at all. (I find this plausible for some
buzzings and musical tones.) The second sensation definitely wasn’t less painful.
We can deny that the first felt more painful than the second, but the second might
not be more painful than the second: it might not be painful at all.
Further problems arise with degreemodifiers, such as slightly or rather. Let F be the
predicate slightly sweet. Take two cups of coffee, call them A and B, and add some
sugar toA. Add just enough so that it’s borderlinewhetherA is slightly sweeter than
B.17 You can deny that B is slightly sweeter than A—it has less sugar—but you can
17It might be on the borderline between slightly sweeter and not sweeter at all, or on the border-
line between slightly sweeter and much sweeter.
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neither assert nor deny that A is slightly sweeter than B. Or consider more precise
measure phrases, such as four centimeters tall. Suppose that I’m shorter than you,
but that the difference between our heights is vague: it hovers somewhere around
four centimeters. We can assert that I’m not four centimeters taller than you, and
we can’t deny that you’re four centimeters taller than me, but you might not be four
centimeters taller than me: you might be taller by slightly less than that.
Other complex comparative constructions pose additional trouble. Consider con-
junctive comparisons, such as bigger and better. Consider two populations, A and
B, where B is bigger than A. On Broome’s population axiology, it may be vague
whether B is better than A; let that be so. Broome would deny that A is bigger and
better than B, because B is bigger than A. And Broome could not deny that B is big-
ger and better than A, because it is vague whether B is better than A. But Broome
could not assert, by his own lights, that B is bigger and better than A. Broome
could simply exclude such comparisons from his collapsing principle. But some
linguists argue that better is implicitly conjunctive over multiple dimensions (Sas-
soon 2013b). If these linguists are right, then excluding conjunctive comparisons
from the collapsing principle would thereby exclude better.
More interesting examples are due to vague identities. Suppose, with Lewis (1988),
that it’s vague whether Princeton = Princeton Borough: our use does not settle
whether “Princeton” refers to the Borough or to the Borough plus the Township or
one of many larger areas. But we know that Princeton is at least as large as Prince-
ton Borough. So we can deny that Princeton Borough is larger than Princeton,
although we cannot deny that Princeton is larger than Princeton Borough. The
collapsing principle implies that Princeton is therefore larger than Princeton Bor-
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ough. But then Lewis’s identity statement would be determinately false, because
nothing is larger than itself.
Vague identities pose additional problems. Suppose that someone undergoes one
of Parfit’s (1984) spectrum operations: we tweak her body and mind so that we
cannot say whether the resulting person is identical to the person we started with.
Then it’s vague whether the operation increases the number of people who ever
exist. There is someone before the operation and someone after the operation,
but it’s vague whether they are the same someone. So it’s vague whether there
are two people where there would’ve otherwise been one. Let A be the world’s
timeless population—i.e., all those who ever live—had the spectrum operation not
occurred, and let B be the population given that the operation occurs. If the oper-
ation preserved identity, then A and B are equally big: the same number of people
ever exist. But if the operation didn’t preserve identity, then B is bigger than A. We
can deny that A is bigger than B, but since we cannot say whether the operation
preserved identity, we cannot deny that B is bigger than A. Nonetheless, B might
not be bigger than A. This violates the collapsing principle.
Broome might avoid these problems by restricting the collapsing principle to
comparisons between determinately distinct items. But similar problems remain,
having to do with vague spatiotemporal boundaries of objects. It may be vague
whether I am taller than my identical twin because it’s vague whether some hair
curl counts as part of my head. If the curl counts as part of my head, then I am
taller, but if not, we’re equally tall. So we can deny that my twin is taller than me,
but can neither assert nor deny that I am taller than him. The vagueness here has
nothing to do with whether I am my twin: I’m determinately not.
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1.4.2 Multidimensional Vagueness
I’m sure that for each of my counterexamples, there is someone who would reject it.
But it seems to me that at least some of the counterexamples are genuine. The col-
lapsing principle looks hard to defend. We could try to revise the principle to avoid
the counterexamples. But they don’t seem to have much in common. Why should
the collapsing principle hold for better but not for absolute predicates, phenome-
nal predicates, degree-modified predicates, conjunctive predicates, or comparisons
involving vague identities or boundaries?
Constantinescu (2012) suggests a unified revision.18 He distinguishes between gen-
uine and derivative comparative vagueness. The vagueness in the counterexamples
is, in some sense, not genuinely comparative. They have to do with how little cur-
vature is required to say that something is flat, our inability to tell whether some
sensation is painful, the vagueness of degree modifiers, the semantics of conjunc-
tive comparisons, and the vagueness of singular terms, personal identity, and spa-
tiotemporal boundaries. Those phenomena are somehow different from, and have
less to do with comparison than, the vagueness of better. The trouble is to say what
exactly is different about better: why is better vague? Constantinescu suggests that
the vagueness of some comparison is genuinely comparative iff “it is not determi-
nate how the contributory values of [two things] should be ranked. In an important
sense, then, this type of vagueness belongs entirely in the realm of comparisons”
(12). And, says Constantinescu, the collapsing principle holds only for this type of
vagueness. We can formulate Constantinescu’s view as follows:
18In response to Carlson (2004). Broome (2009) finds Carlson’s counterexample unconvincing.
But Broome’s response does not apply to my counterexamples.
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Multidimensional Collapsing Principle: For any predicate F and any things A
and B, if we can deny that B is Fer than A, but, because the relative weights
of F’s dimensions are vague, we cannot deny that A is Fer than B, then A is
Fer than B.
If Constantinescu is right, then Broome’s argument succeeds only if the vague-
ness of better is genuinely comparative in this sense—that is, multidimensional
vagueness. This is important because it limits the scope of Broome’s objection: we
needn’t worry about it unless our incomplete axiology is multidimensional.19
I do not endorse the multidimensional collapsing principle. But the only coun-
terexamples I can think of are cases of parity, which would beg the question in this
context. And I think the principle has something going for it: why should con-
flicts between imprecisely weighted dimensions generate both parity and vague-
ness? This is a question, not an argument. I hesitate to accept or reject the principle.
I am, though, inclined to agree that the only genuinely comparative vagueness is
multidimensional vagueness.
Broome (2007) sees no need to provide an explanation for why better is vague, on
the grounds that almost every predicate in natural language is vague. But some
linguists and philosophers of language hold that adjectives only exhibit vagueness
in the positive form—e.g., good, tall, and bald.20 And others hold that unidimen-
sional predicates are never vague in the comparative form (Egre and Klinedinst
2010). The best explanation of why better is vague seems to me that it is multidi-
19Alternatively, we might worry that no appeal to parity can meet both the multidimensional
collapsing principle and the tradeoff constraint. I discuss this worry on page 112.
20See Cooper (1995), Kennedy (2007), and Kennedy (2011).
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mensional. When it is vague which of two things is better, that is because each is
better than the other in some ways but not in others. The weights of these dimen-
sions may be imprecise, and this generates vagueness. This is the same story that
Broome tells about parity, but applied to vagueness.
Broome (1999, 123), however, argues that unidimensional comparisons can be
vague. It can be vague, for example, which of two color patches is redder. Redness,
Broome thinks, is unidimensional. But it’s not: redness depends on hue, brightness,
and saturation (Hyde 2012, 17). It’s often vague which of two patches is redder be-
cause they differ along these dimensions. Broome might say that it could be vague
which of two patches is redder even if they differ only with respect to hue. But
these patches could, in principle, be placed on a color wheel, and the one closer to
0° hue would be redder.21
Broome (2007, 555f.) offers another example. He asks us to compare a range of
sauvignon blancs with a moderately good chardonnay. Suppose that we cannot
distinguish between each wine in the range, but that our best sauvignon blancs
are better, and our worst sauvignon blancs are worse, than than our chardonnay.
Broome infers that because there is no sharp borderline between which wines are
better and which are not better than the chardonnay, better must be vague.
There is a source of noise in Broome’s example, which makes it hard to identify ex-
actly what is vague and why. When Broome stipulates that we cannot distinguish
between the skillfully blended wines, this makes it hard to tell whether the result-
21Broome might respond that we cannot detect which patch is closer to 0° hue. But Raffman
(2011) shows that we can detect such differences, although we often don’t know when we detect
them.
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ing vagueness is due to the vagueness of better. We need to distinguish between the
vagueness of better and the vagueness of tastes and other observational or phenom-
enal predicates.22 To control for issues of perceptual discrimination, we should
imagine that we can distinguish between how the wines taste, and that we have
sharp preferences between sauvignon blancs. If it is still vague which sauvignon
blancs are better than the chardonnay, then that vagueness seems multidimen-
sional. Wine quality depends on many different factors, and that is why Broome’s
example requires wines of different grapes, which are good in different ways. I can-
not see why else we would have sharp preferences over wines of one grape but not
over wines of different grapes.
I conclude that Broome’s examples of comparative vagueness are cases of multidi-
mensional vagueness. They are, therefore, consistent with the hypothesis that if
better is vague, this is because of multidimensionality.
This is a problem for Broome’s axiology, because the vagueness in Broome’s axi-
ology is not multidimensional. It has no more to do with tradeoffs between im-
precisely weighted dimensions of value than critical-band utilitarianism. Broome
would say that he predicts vagueness when and because adding lives is better ac-
cording to some precisifications of the critical level, but not according to others.
But this is no less ad hoc than the critical-band utilitarian’s appeal to different criti-
cal levels as distinct dimensions of value, which we considered on page 18. It looks
nothing like the multidimensional vagueness that we find in other adjectives just
22For example, we may be unable to say which of two massive numbers seems smaller, because
they are represented in complicated ways. But we can’t infer from this that smaller number is vague:
it is a paradigm of precision. The vagueness, if there is any, is in how the numbers seem, not in how
small they are.
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like better.23 Broome’s arbitrariness objection applies to his own view.
1.5 Conclusion
I began this chapter with a version of the mere addition paradox. Parfit suggests
that adding lives worth living doesn’t make things worse, nor does it make things at
least as good. This violates completeness. I introduced critical-band utilitarianism,
which tries to develop Parfit’s suggestion, and interpreted the critical band as a zone
of parity. I then agreed with Broome that the appeal to parity is arbitrary: mere
addition seems not to involve a conflict between incommensurable dimensions of
value. Critical-band utilitarianism, therefore, violates the tradeoff constraint stated
on page 18. There might be exceptions to the tradeoff constraint—e.g., interdimen-
sional imprecision—but they do not seem promising for population axiology. I
found Rabinowicz’s attempts to justify critical-band utilitarianism unconvincing.
I then considered Broome’s vagueness objection. I argued that the collapsing prin-
ciple is subject to a wide range of counterexamples. But it might survive in a more
limited form, if themultidimensional collapsing principle is true. Constantinescu’s
restriction of the collapsing principle to multidimensional vagueness is motivated
by the thought that comparatives are usually vague when and because the weights
of their dimensions are vague. I have no argument against the multidimensional
collapsing principle, so I hesitate to reject it. It may be hard to appeal to parity
in a way that meets both the tradeoff constraint and the multidimensional collaps-
ing principle; I suggest a view that might do this in Section 3.2. But I argued that
23See Sassoon (2013a) and Grinsell (2013).
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Broome’s vague axiology is also ad hoc: we should expect vague betterness, like
parity, when there are tradeoffs between dimensions of value.24
In Chapter 2, I discuss a view that avoids Broome’s objections. It is what critical-
band utilitarianism would look like if the critical band was unbounded above and
below. On Bader’s view, mere addition results in incomparability, rather than par-
ity.
24You might wonder why I haven’t addressed Broome’s greediness objection, which he identifies
as his most serious problem for critical-band utilitarianism. The reason is that I think it brings
up the same issue as the arbitrariness objection, but in a less pure form. The greediness objection
trades on an ambiguity in what Broome calls “a neutral thing” (170): if mere addition is good in
some ways and bad in others, it might be neutral all things considered, but the ways in which it is
good or bad may “swallow up” (198) other values. So if the tradeoff constraint can be met, then so
can the greediness objection. This is clearest in Rabinowicz’s response to the greediness objection:
he accepts that adding people “has a value that counts against other values” (203). This avoids the
greediness objection. But what is that value? That’s the arbitrariness objection. The greediness
objection also raises important practical difficulties, to which I have no solution.
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2 Incomparability and Average Utilitarianism
Bader rejects the mere addition principle because he is, like Narveson (1973, 80),
“in favour of making people happy, but neutral about making happy people.” This
chapter is about Bader’s attempt to explain the neutrality of creating happy people
in terms of incomparability. In Section 2.1, I summarize Bader’s view. The view has
many moving parts, some of which I skip and most of which I oversimplify. After
summarizing the view, I present two objections to it. I then claim that average
utilitarianism can avoid these objections in a way that captures some of the virtues
of Bader’s view. In Section 2.2, I argue that average utilitarianism can elegantly
capture the neutrality of creating happy people. In Section 2.3, I argue that average
utilitarianism is impartial without being impersonal, and that it gives intuitively
correct verdicts in infinite cases. In Section 2.4, I suggest a way of dealing with the
most counterintuitive implications of average utilitarianism.
2.1 Bader’s View
The core of Bader’s population axiology is
The Equinumerosity Constraint: If two distributions contain different numbers
of people, neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good: they are
incomparable.25
25Bader instead uses “non-comparable” to emphasize a formal, rather than substantive, failure of
the betterness relation.
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Bader argues that the equinumerosity constraint follows from the fact that lives
are incomparable with nonexistence for the people living them, along with the re-
ducibility of betterness to betterness for people. Although Bader prohibits compar-
isons between different-sized populations, he—unlike Heyd (1988) and Morton
(1994)—allows comparisons between disjoint populations of the same size. He ac-
cepts
Strong Impartiality: For any distributions A and B containing the same number
of people, if A and B are permutations of each other, then they are equally
good.26
Bader’s view, therefore, avoids the nonidentity problem. It is better to bring a better
life rather than a worse life into existence, even if they would be lived by different
people. Moreover, Bader allows for other comparisons between populations of the
same size. He appeals to a method of
Balancing Gains and Losses: A is at least as good as B iff there is a bijection f ∶
A→ B such that ∑
a∈A
[a − f(a)] ≥ 0.
A bijection from A to B is just a function that pairs every member of A with just
one member of B, and pairs every member B with just one member of A. It is a
one-to-one correspondence between A and B.27 Balancing says that which of two
26Two distinct distributions are permutations of each other iff all and only same wellbeing levels
exist in both, but they are rearranged among people.
27The identity-preserving bijection, in which each person is paired with herself, is a special case.
For Bader, it doesn’t matter which bijection we use. In infinite cases, he requires distributions to be
better according to every bijection.
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distributions is better depends not on the sum of people’s wellbeing in each distri-
bution, but rather on the sum of the differences between people’s wellbeing across
the distributions. It therefore avoids “conflating all persons into one” (Rawls 1999,
24) or caring about “utilities that are not someone’s” (Bennett 1978, 63–64). In
finite, fixed-population cases, this method coincides with total and average utili-
tarianism. But it entails the equinumerosity constraint. For if A and B contain
different numbers of people, then there can be no bijection between them, so nei-
ther is at least as good as the other.
The equinumerosity constraint implies that the repugnant conclusion is false, and
that mere addition does not make things better. But it also implies the weak re-
pugnant conclusion stated on page 14: Z is not worse than A. However, Bader
introduces further machinery that softens this conclusion. He allows for a kind
of dominance reasoning for preferring and choosing one distribution rather than
another. If A is smaller than B, then we can compare A with each A-sized subset of
B. If every A-sized subset of B is at least as good as A according to balancing, and
some such subset is better, then B dominates A. Similarly, if A is at least as good as
every A-sized subset of B according to balancing, and A is better than some such
subset, then A dominates B.
Bader then uses this dominance reasoning to help us choose between distributions.
When choosing between various distributions, we first separate the smallest distri-
bution(s) from all the distributions that are bigger than it. (The smallest distribu-
tion might contain no one.) We have no reason to choose a minimal distribution
(i.e., one of the smallest ones) rather than a bigger one, or vice versa. But, if we
choose a bigger one, then we should not choose one that is dominated by another.
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We might call this a conditional choiceworthiness relation: a non-minimal distribu-
tion that is dominated by another other non-minimal distribution is less choice-
worthy, conditional on choosing a non-minimal distribution. But non-minimal
distributions are neither more nor less choiceworthy than minimal ones. And be-
tween all the minimal ones, the better ones are more choiceworthy. We ought not
to choose an option that is less choiceworthy than some available alternative.
Suppose that wemust choose between an empty distribution, a quality distribution
(A), and a quantity distribution (Z). Bader says that we have nomore or less reason
to choose A or Z than we have to choose the empty one. But, conditional on choos-
ing either of the non-empty distributions, we shouldn’t choose Z. Suppose next
that we must choose between A and Z, with no empty option. In this case, Bader’s
choiceworthiness relation is silent, because it does not compare minimal with non-
minimal distributions. But, if we have several intermediate options—e.g., B, C,
etc.—it becomes wrong to chose Z, although permissible to choose either A or B.
Finally, Bader introduces deontic constraints against adding lives that are worth
not living. According to the procreative asymmetry, the fact that someone’s life
would be worth living is not (in itself) a moral reason to create her, but the fact that
someone’s life would be worth not living is (in itself) a moral reason not to create
her (McMahan 1981). Bader has a compelling explanation of the second half of the
asymmetry. Roughly, miserable lives are such that, if we add them, we would have
reason to shorten themasmuch as possible so that, in the limit, theywouldnot exist.
But we have reason not to do things that, if we do them, we would have reason
to undo them. So, although Bader’s method of balancing is silent regarding the
addition of miserable lives, and although such lives are not worse for people than
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nonexistence, the choiceworthiness relation says not to add them. The constraint
against adding such lives trumps the conditional choiceworthiness of choosing a
dominant distribution.28 However, it can be permissible to add miserable lives if
the positive externalities (for either existing people or others who are added) are
sufficiently great. Adding some lives of total misery −H is permissible iff doing so
increases the total amount of happiness by at least as much as H.29
Bader’s theory avoids the repugnant conclusion, solves the nonidentity problem,
captures the neutrality intuition, and explains the procreative asymmetry. It is also
not threatened by Broome’s arbitrariness or vagueness objections. I observed on
page 19 that incomparability is not subject to the tradeoff constraint. What about
vagueness? I suggested on page 34 that it can be vague howmany people exist. This
might have been a problem for Bader if Broome’s original collapsing principle were
true. But the most plausible collapsing principle is something like the multidimen-
sional one stated on page 36, which applies only when the weights of conflicting
dimensions are vague. Bader’s view appeals to no such weights. If it is ever vague
whether A is better than or incomparable with B, the vagueness will not be due to
imprecisely weighted dimensions of value.
I have two objections to Bader’s view.
First, Bader’s view implies
TheWeak Deontic Very Repugnant Conclusion: For any number of excellent
28This is not, strictly speaking, part of Bader’s view. But I think it makes it more plausible in cases
where one chooses to violate the deontic constraint against adding such lives and then must choose
between distributions that violate this constraint, some of which dominate others.
29Bader’s justification for this is more elegant than a brute appeal to sums of happiness. It has to
do with shortenings of the positive-externality lives.
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lives and any number of horrible lives, there is some number of mediocre
lives whose existence, along with the horrible lives, would be permissible to
bring about, when the only alternative is to create only the excellent lives
instead.30
For example, suppose that we must choose between two worlds. In A, there are ten
billion people with excellent lives. In Z, these same people and 90 billion others
suffer great agony for fifty years. They suffer so that n other people can exist with
lives that are barely worth living. The weak deontic very repugnant conclusion
implies that, for some n, it is permissible to choose Z.
Bader’s view implies the weak deontic very repugnant conclusion because the
choiceworthiness relation is silent when deciding whether to add people: A is the
minimal distribution, and the question is whether to expand the population to Z.
Although A dominates Z, Bader says that non-minimal distributions are neither
more nor less choiceworthy thanminimal ones. And the deontic constraint against
adding miserable lives is not violated in choosing Z: the positive externalities for
n people make it permissible to bring about the hundred billion. So Bader’s view
implies the weak deontic very repugnant conclusion.
Bader might appeal to additional deontic constraints against choosing Z in some
circumstances. We might, for example, be using some people merely as means to
our end of expanding the population. But suppose that the agent doesn’t know
whether the populations share any members, doesn’t care whether there are more
or fewer people, and, under the influence of Bader’s theory, sees no reason to
30See Arrhenius (forthcoming) for the very repugnant conclusion. This is a “weak deontic” ver-
sion because it claims that adding the worse lives is permissible.
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choose either distribution. It seems that, if she plumps for Z, she doesn’t thereby
use anyone merely as a means to any end, although she does act wrongly.
Bader might simply bite the bullet of the weak deontic very repugnant conclusion.
But Bader’s view is subject to a particularly counterintuitive version of the Egyp-
tology objection.31 Suppose that I could have either zero, two, or three children.
None of them would have further children, and my choice wouldn’t affect anyone
else’s wellbeing in any other way. They would all have equally great lives at, say,
10. I know, from reading my Bader, that it doesn’t matter morally whether I have
children or not. But, if I have children, then I should have whichever number of
children would bring about a dominant distribution. I know the welfare level of
everyone who has ever existed or will ever exist—except for the ancient Egyptians.
Suppose that the ancient Egyptians were either all at 9 or all at 11, and that every-
one else who has ever lived is at 10. If they were at level 9, then the distribution
where I have three children dominates the distribution where I have two children.
They look like these:
A = (9, 9, . . . , 9, 10, 10, . . . , 10,Ω,Ω,Ω)
B = (9, 9, . . . , 9, 10, 10, . . . , 10, 10, 10,Ω)
C = (9, 9, . . . , 9, 10, 10, . . . , 10, 10, 10, 10)
The ancient Egyptians are the first people in each list. Everyone who comes after
them is better off. I am the last person in A, and the next three slots are those of my
31See Parfit (1984, 120) and McMahan (1981).
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children. Every B-sized subset of C is at least as good as B according to balancing,
and some subsets (any including my three children) are better. So C dominates B.
Therefore, conditional on my having children, I should have three children rather
than two. But if the ancient Egyptians were better off, then the distributions look
like these:
A′ = (11, 11, . . . , 11, 10, 10, . . . , 10,Ω,Ω,Ω)
B′ = (11, 11, . . . , 11, 10, 10, . . . , 10, 10, 10,Ω)
C′ = (11, 11, . . . , 11, 10, 10, . . . , 10, 10, 10, 10)
Now B′ dominates C′. B′ is at least as good as every B′-sized subset of C′, and better
than some such subsets (any including my three children). Therefore, conditional
on my having children, I should have two children rather than three.
Bader’s choiceworthiness relation is supposed to tell me what I ought to choose.
It doesn’t say that having children is more choiceworthy than not having children,
or vice versa: I can permissibly either have children or remain childless. But if
the ancient Egyptians lived one way, then I shouldn’t have two children. If they
lived another way, then I shouldn’t have three. The number of children that I can
permissibly have depends on the welfare of the ancient Egyptians. That is absurd.
Call this the deontic Egyptology objection.
On some population axiologies, the contributive value of my having two rather
than three children—i.e., their impact on the goodness of the world—can depend
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on the welfare of the ancient Egyptians. That is the axiological Egyptology objection,
and it too seems absurd. But, as Carlson (1998) points out, it is less absurd than the
deontic version. Our primary intuition is that the welfare of the ancient Egyptians
cannot affect whether or how many children you ought to have. Bader’s view, how-
ever, violates this deontic intuition. On Bader’s view, it is neither better nor worse
for me to have two children rather than three, no matter the welfare of the ancient
Egyptians. But, depending on how the ancient Egyptians lived, I either ought not
to have two or ought not to have three, even though neither choice would make
things worse. I cannot see how that could possibly be true.
Bader might respond by appealing to what he calls fine-grained expansion
conditions—e.g., expanding the population to size n, rather than merely expand-
ing the population. He says that we can always permissibly choose there to be n
people (assuming no violation of the asymmetry). Our conduct is then guided by
the choiceworthiness relation whose condition is expanding to size n. But if we
merely choose to expand the population, without a specific number in mind, our
conduct is guided by the choiceworthiness relation whose condition is expanding
simpliciter. In the present case, therefore, it is permissible for me to choose to have
any number of children I’d like. But if I merely choose to have children, without a
number in mind, I ought not to have either two or three children, depending on
how the ancient Egyptians lived. This strikes me as no more plausible than the
original verdict. It also makes Bader’s response to the repugnant conclusion less
satisfying: we make permissibly choose Z just by wanting or deciding that there
be as many people as possible.
Bader could avoid my objection by restricting his evaluation to distributions of
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welfare over the people affected by our choice. But the view is already quite com-
plicated. I explain in Section 2.2 how, if Bader makes this kind of move, he might
as well be an average utilitarian.
2.2 Deontic Neutrality
Bader can avoid the deontic Egyptology objection by accepting
Independence of the Unaffected: What one has most (welfare-based) reason to
do in some choice situation depends only on the distributions over people
whose welfare is affected by our choice.
Who are these people? If some people’s wellbeing would remain the same whatever
we do (e.g., the ancient Egyptians), then they are not affected bywhat we do, so they
are excluded from the distributions of welfare whose value (or choiceworthiness)
determines what we ought to do. If their wellbeing would be greater or less, then
they are included in the relevant distributions. If they might not exist, depending
on what we do, then we also include them: their happiness is affected, although not
for good or ill.32 I say that people are affected in a choice situation iff their welfare
differs in at least some of the distributions available.
Suppose we accept independence of the unaffected. Bader’s view can then avoid
the deontic Egyptology objection. But so can average utilitarianism. According
to average utilitarianism, A is better than B iff the A-people are, on average, better
32We might, alternatively, exclude them if there is a welfare-preserving bijection between some
lives in different distributions.
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off than the B-people.33 Average utilitarianism says, in the Egyptology cases above,
that C is better than B, which is better than A, and that C′ is worse than B′, which is
worse than A′. But the subdistributions over those affected by our choice are these:
A′′ = (Ω,Ω,Ω)
B′′ = (10, 10,Ω)
C′′ = (10, 10, 10)
We can ignore the welfare of the ancient Egyptians because our choice does not
affect them. The only people affected are my children. The average wellbeing in
A′′ is undefined, so it is incomparable with B′′ and C′′, which are as good as each
other. So we have no more reason to choose any one of these subdistributions: I
can permissibly have zero, two, or three children.
Average utilitarianism still implies the axiological Egyptology objection, but I agree
with Carlson that the intuition is primarily deontic. Broome (194) objects that he
cannot understand how goodness, in such cases, could be irrelevant to what we
ought to do. But, according to independence of the unaffected, goodness is still
relevant to what we ought to do: the goodness of the lives affected by our choice.
Average utilitarianism along with independence of the unaffected implies
Strong Deontic Neutrality: We have no (welfare-based) reason to add or not to
33By “average,” Imean the arithmeticmean. By “theA-people,” Imean everyonewho ever lives in
A. And by “better off,” I mean higher lifetime wellbeing. The view says nothing about aggregation
within lives.
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add good lives in a way that affects no one else.
We saw above that A′′ is incomparable with B′′ and C′′. This is because the average
wellbeing of an empty distribution is undefined. And, in any case of mere addition,
the relevant subdistribution in which we don’t add lives is empty. We only acquire
reasons to expand the population when doing so would affect other people.
I think that average utilitarianism captures the best of Bader’s view because, if we
accept independence of the unaffected, average utilitarianism provides a simpler
account of the neutrality of creating happy lives. This account appeals to incompa-
rability with the empty distribution. It rejects the mere addition principle without
implying the weak repugnant (or weak deontic very repugnant) conclusion. And
it doesn’t require the equinumerosity constraint, dominance, or the conditional
choiceworthiness relation.
I shall consider five objections to this average utilitarian strategy.
First, it might be objected that average utilitarianism still generates implausible
reasons for or against adding people. Suppose, for example, you can have a child
who will be better off than you, but doing so will make you worse off:
D = (4,Ω)
E = (3, 6)
D is the subdistribution if you don’t have a child, and E is the subdistribution if you
do. Average wellbeing is greater in E than inD. So you ought to have children, even
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though this makes things worse for you and better for no one. Similar reasoning
shows that, according to average utilitarianism, you oughtnot to have children even
in cases where doing so would be better for you and worse for no one.
This might seem a bad result because we take permissive views about the morality
of procreation. I agree that it would be strange if we could be obligated to have
children even though doing so would be worse for us, or obligated not to have chil-
dren even though doing so would be better for us. But I think that such claims can
be better explained in other ways than rejecting the average (and total!) utilitarian
judgment that E is better than D. Many people independently think that we can
justifiably pursue our own good (within limits) even when doing so fails to make
things go impartially best (Scheffler 1994). And others think that the agent’s own
happiness is not, in itself, relevant to what she morally ought to do (Ross 1939), or
that utilitarians should downplay the agent’s happiness in some more sophisticated
way (Sider 1993). We might think that agent-relativity shows up in other ways: I
think, for example, that it may be permissible for me to have a child even if her
existence (by some strange accident) prevents the existence of some stranger who
would have a slightly better life. That permission is agent-relative because, in gen-
eral, one ought to bring about a better rather than worse life. Therefore, although
there may remain some counterintuitive implications about procreation even after
adding independence of the unaffected, these intuitions might be more plausibly
accommodated in other ways.34
Second, it might be objected that strong deontic neutrality doesn’t fully vindicate
34These agent-relative suggestions do not endanger the impartiality of the axiology, because they
only affect what we ought to do, not which distributions are better or worse.
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our neutrality towards creating happy people. For example, it does not let us ignore
changes in population size when deciding whether to save people’s lives (Broome
2009). But this practice seems to me unjustifiable.35 Average utilitarianism at least
avoids the pitfalls of theories that try to justify this practice. For example, Broome
supposes that global warming will kill a hundredmillion people and prevent a hun-
dred million more from coming into existence. He imagines that the distributions
are these:
F = (4, 4, . . . , 4, 4, 4)
G = (4, 4, . . . , 4, 2,Ω).
Each location represents the welfare of a hundred million people. F is how things
would’ve been without global warming. Broome’s theory implies that we cannot
assert (or deny) that F is better than G, because the value of the critical level is
vague. Broome cannot say that global warming is bad. Average utilitarianism, by
contrast, says that G is worse than F, and that we ought to prevent global warming
in this scenario.
Third, independence of the unaffected might yield counterintuitive results when
considering extinction. Suppose that, if humanity continues to reproduce, the dis-
tribution will be H, and otherwise it will be I:
H = (4, 4, . . . , 4, 9, 9, . . . , 9)
35Or, if it can be justified, it must be justified on very different grounds—e.g., related to our
ignorance about how acts affect population size.
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I = (4, 4, . . . , 4,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω)
Average utilitarianism says that H is better than I. But independence of the unaf-
fected says to focus only on the welfare levels after 4—i.e., those of our descendants.
And those subdistributions of H and I are incomparable. So we have no moral rea-
son to continue to reproduce, even though the world will be better if we do. If
some generation of humans could make themselves the last one, without affecting
anyone else (including other species), they could permissibly do so.
I am not sure what to make of this conclusion. It does not strike me as obviously
wrong for people not to reproduce, even if doing so would mean that humanity
becomes extinct. But, to the extent that I find the conclusion counterintuitive, I
think that the fault lies neither with average utilitarianism nor with independence
of the unaffected. It may just be a deep mistake to suppose that present and past
people’s welfare could be unaffected by extinction. As Scheffler (2013) has argued,
the value of our own lives and projects may depend on the future of humanity. It
seems to me that the sting of the objection might be removed by Scheffler’s insight.
If Scheffler is right, then a human extinction scenario would look more like this:
I′ = (2, 2, . . . , 2,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω)
Average utilitarianism says that this is worse than H. So we shouldn’t let humanity
go extinct. Maybe Scheffler is wrong, in which case I does reflect an extinction
scenario relative to H. But then I would find it reasonable to deny that we have an
obligation to continue our species.
55
Fourth, independence of the unaffected allows a sequence of permissible choices
to yield a worse outcome. Recall the version of the mere addition paradox I gave
on page 7. Suppose first that our options are these:
A = (100,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω),
A+ = (100, 1, 1, . . . , 1).
Independence of the unaffected tells us to ignore the first slot of people. Average
utilitarianism then says that it’s permissible to create the extra people, because the
relevant subdistributions are incomparable. Suppose we do so. Suppose next that
we can move from A+ to
Z = (2, 2, 2, . . . , 2).
Independence of the unaffected is no longer relevant. We are now required to bring
about Z, because it contains greater average wellbeing than A+. A permissible
choice and an obligatory choice lead to Z, which is worse than where we started. If
we were only choosing between A and Z, or between all three outcomes, we ought
to have brought about A. And yet here we are.
This strikesme as undesirable, but not implausible. In fact, it capturesmy intuitions
about the mere addition paradox pretty well. Intuitively, it is permissible, if we are
in A, to bring aboutA+. And, intuitively, if we are in A+, we ought to bring about Z.
But, intuitively,A is better thanZ. It is unfortunate and confusing that a permissible
56
choice and an obligatory choice can together lead us to a worse outcome. But this
conclusion does not strike me as impossible, repugnant, or less plausible than the
conjunction of the premises that got us there.
Fifth, independence of the unaffected might be accused of being ad hoc; many ar-
bitrary restrictions of average utilitarianism have been proposed (see McMahan
1981). But independence of the unaffected does not draw an arbitrary distinction—
e.g., between persons living at different times. Even Sidgwick (1874 IV.1.1) restricts
utilitarianism to “all whose happiness is affected by the conduct.”
Moreover, total utilitarians may need to appeal to independence of the unaffected
to get plausible results in infinite cases. Suppose that if you save some person’s
life, her lifetime wellbeing will be greater and there will be no other effects, but
that there are infinitely many happy people. Your act does not increase the sum of
wellbeing in the world. A partial solution to this “infinitarian paralysis problem”
(Bostrom 2011) is to accept independence of the unaffected. Then, when your act
does a finite amount of good, it still matters despite the infinite value of the uni-
verse.36 So my claim isn’t just that average utilitarians should accept this principle.
I think everyone should accept it.
Independence of the unaffectedmay seem arbitrary to those who thinkwe ought to
make the history of the world go best. The history of the world includes unaffected
people. But it seems to me that this view is essentially impersonal: it ascribes good-
ness to an entity—theworld or its history—that isn’t a person. I argue in Section 2.3
that average utilitarianism rests on person-affecting foundations, on which all bet-
36This doesn’t address the infinite cases discussed in Section 2.3.2.
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terness is betterness for someone. Average utilitarians care not about the goodness
of the world or its history, but rather about the goodness of lives. Independence
of the unaffected adds that, when deciding what to do, they should care about the
goodness of the lives affected.
2.3 Balancing vs. Averaging
The main difference between Bader’s view and average utilitarianism is the equinu-
merosity constraint. This constraint might be justified by Bader’s method of bal-
ancing gains and losses, which only works in same-number cases. This method,
which I stated on page 42, appeals to the differences between people’s wellbeing,
not to their sums. But it allows us to compare distributions with different mem-
bers, because everyone’s wellbeing can be measured on the same scale.
In this section, I discuss three reasons why Bader might reject average utilitarian-
ism as inferior to balancing: first, average utilitarianism require sums of wellbeing
to bemeaningful quantities; second, average utilitarians cannot account for infinite
cases; and third, average utilitarianism is arbitrary. I defend average utilitarianism
against these objections.
2.3.1 Sums of Wellbeing
Average utilitarians evaluate a distribution by adding up different people’s wellbe-
ing and dividing the sum by the number of people. Bader might therefore object
that average utilitarianism “constructs a special moral point of view by combin-
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ing those of individuals into a single conglomerate viewpoint distinct from all of
them” (Nagel 2012, 123). Bader’s method of balancing eschews impersonal sums
of different people’s wellbeing.
We might wonder why differences between people’s wellbeing are kosher while
sums are not. We need differences to make interpersonal comparisons of wellbe-
ing. But the difference between two quantities of wellbeing is a quantity of wellbe-
ing, and it isn’t someone’s. Moreover, if our interpersonal scale of wellbeing has a
meaningful zero and negative quantities (i.e., lives worth not living), then we can
understand the sum of x’s wellbeing and y’s wellbeing as the difference between x’s
wellbeing and the additive inverse of y’s wellbeing.
But Badermight say although sums ofwellbeing aremeaningful quantities, they are
not axiologically significant. However, average utilitarians can determine which
distributions contain better lives without summing different people’s wellbeing.
Consider an example:
A = (2, 8,Ω)
B = (1, 8, 12)
Take the average of the differences between the first life in A and the lives in B:
(2 − 1) + (2 − 8) + (2 − 12)
3
= −5
Then take the average of the differences between the second life in A and the lives
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in B:
(8 − 1) + (8 − 8) + (8 − 12)
3
= 1




This means that, on average, the difference between the lives in A and the lives in B
is −2. And indeed this equals the difference between A’s average wellbeing (5) and
B’s (7).
This method, however, does not add up different people’s wellbeing. It only, like
Bader’s method, adds up differences between people’s wellbeing. Average utilitar-
ianism, therefore, does not require meaningful or axiologically significant sums
of different people’s wellbeing. It is, of course, easier to compute the average dif-
ference between lives by taking the difference between the averages of them; that
involves summing different people’s wellbeing. But we can understand that as a
shortcut for the moral arithmetic above. The two methods give the same results.37
This is not mysterious. The sum of temperatures on the Celsius scale is not a mean-
ingful quantity. But their average is, as is the average difference between two sets
of temperatures.38
37At least, in all finite cases.
38Similarly for dates on a calendar.
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2.3.2 Infinite Cases
Bader’s balancing approach works well in infinite cases. It intuitively ranks A over
B in the following case:
A = (2, 2, 2, 2, . . . )
B = (1, 1, 1, 1, . . . )
The ellipses after the last number means that the sequence is infinite. The series
of differences between each A-life and each B-life diverges, so Bader says that A
is better than B. Total utilitarianism, however, implies that A is not better than B,
because each sum diverges, so neither sum is greater than the other.
Bader’s view also gives good results when balancing gains and losses against distri-








, . . .)
If we add C’s terms in the order presented, the series converges to a finite number—







,+ . . .
diverges. Riemann’s (1867) rearrangement theorem says that C’s terms can there-
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fore be rearranged to add up to any value whatsoever. It is, therefore, problematic
for total utilitarianism to assign a value to C. Total utilitarianism would then vio-
late impartiality: it wouldmatter which people leadwhich lives, or when andwhere
they live. So total utilitarians cannot say that A is better than C. Bader’s method,
by contrast, says that A is better than C, regardless of how C’s terms are arranged.
This seems right, because everyone in C is worse off than everyone in A, and all of
the A-lives are worth living.
Bader might reject average utilitarianism because it cannot account for infinite
cases. It asks us to divide an infinite sum of wellbeing by an infinite number of
people. That is undefined. So average utilitarianism fares no better than total utili-
tarianism in infinite cases.
Average utilitarianism, however, can be extended in a natural way to capture these
judgments. Instead of nonsensically dividing an infinite sum by infinity, we can
understand the “average” of an infinitely large welfare distribution as follows. Sup-
pose that some distribution X is an infinite sequence of welfare levels (xk). Recall







2 + 2 + 2
3
,
2 + 2 + 2 + 2
4
, . . .
This form a new sequence, whose terms are called the Cesàro averages of (xk):
2, 2, 2, 2, . . .
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This sequence converges to 2. The limit of X’s sequence of averages, as n goes to
infinity, is what I call the average wellbeing of X. That is,








A’s sequence of Cesàro averages converges to 2. B’s sequence of Cesàro averages
converges to 1. So A’s average wellbeing is greater than B’s.
If we are against sums of different people’s wellbeing but, like Bader, countenance
differences, we can instead take Cesàro averages of differences. The first life in A is
better than each life in B by
1, 1, 1, 1, . . .
This is a sequence of welfare differences. The sequence of its Cesàro averages is
1, 1, 1, 1, . . .
This sequence converges to 1. That is, in my sense, the average difference between
the first person’s wellbeing in A and the wellbeing of each person in B. If we do this
for everyone else in A, we get the following sequence of average differences:
1, 1, 1, 1, . . .
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This sequence’s Cesàro averages, as before, converge to 1. In this sense, the A-
people are, on average, better off than B-people by 1 unit, and twice as well off as









, . . .)
Its average wellbeing is 0: its terms tend to 0, and the limit of Cesàro averages of a
convergent sequence is just the limit of the original sequence (Katznelson 2004, 13).
Moreover, since the limit of a convergent sequence (not the series—i.e., the sum of
its terms) does not depend on how its terms are arranged, the limit of C’s Cesàro
averages will always be 0. This is holds for all conditionally convergent series: their
terms converge to 0, so their Cesàro averages do too.
Average utilitarianism assigns a value to C: 0. It, therefore, secures the intuitive
result that A is better than C. So far, I have explained how average utilitarianism
fares better than total utilitarianism andnoworse thanBader’smethod of balancing
in the cases he considers. Does it have any advantage over Bader’s method?
I think so. Bader’s method cannot usefully tell us how much better one infinite
distribution is than another:
A = (2, 2, 2, 2, . . . )
B = (1, 1, 1, 1, . . . )
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D = (5, 5, 5, 5, . . . )
The sum of the differences between the A-people and the B-people is infinite, as is
that of the differences between the D-people and the A-people. This doesn’t let us
say that D is better than A by more than A is better than B. Average utilitarianism
lets us say this, because the average levels in A, B, and D are 2, 1, and 5, respectively.
This is an important advantage when it comes to practical questions—e.g., how
blameworthy one would be for choosing wrongly, or whether a gamble with even
odds of B and D is preferable to having A with certainty. Average utilitarianism has
this advantage over Bader’s view.39
I have discussed only the infinite distributions that Bader considers. Average util-
itarianism may give less plausible results in other cases. And the evidential value
of such cases may be limited, given our poor intuitive grasp of infinity. So I shall
turn to a different reason why Bader might reject average utilitarianism.
2.3.3 Foundations of Average Utilitarianism
Average utilitarianism is often dismissed as arbitrary. Why should care whether,
on average, better lives are lived? Temkin (1993) argues that the fundamental util-
itarian intuition is that more of the good is better. Average utilitarianism seems
arbitrary because it does not satisfy this intuition. And, without this intuition, why
be utilitarian?
Average utilitarianism is indeed not supported by the impersonal intuition that
39Bader might, of course, introduce new machinery to answer these questions.
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more of the good is better. It is instead supported by
The Impartial Person-Affecting View: A is better than B iff A is better for the A-
people than B is for the B-people.40
This view appeals to what I called an interdimensional comparison on page 22.41
Impartial person-affecting theorists care about making people happy, in the sense
that they prefer that better lives are lived. Total utilitarians care about this too, in-
directly. But impartial person-affecting theorists do not care about making happy
people: they do not care about the number of good lives. Nor do they care about
making particular people happy: they do not care which lives are whose. That sep-
arates impartial person-affecting theorists from partial person-affecting theorists,
who care more about present, actual, or independently existing people (Arrhenius
forthcoming, ch. 9).
Average utilitarianism can be understood as an interpretation of the impartial
person-affecting view: A is better for the A-people than B is for the B-people iff the
A-lives are, on average, better than the B-lives (cf. Parfit 1984, 396). Bader accepts
the impartial person-affecting view but interprets it differently. He thinks that the
A-lives are better than the B-lives iff they are better via his method of balancing,
which requires equinumerosity. He then extends this method to different-number
cases through the dominance relation defined on page 43. Average utilitarianism
40This view is closer to what Temkin (2012) calls a wide person-affecting view than to Parfit’s
view of the same name, which is framed in terms of benefits.
41We might add, with Sen (1970b), that interpersonal comparability of wellbeing must be impre-
cise. But I have been pretending that our scale of wellbeing is precise.
66
is just a simpler interpretation of the impartial person-affecting view. It cap-
tures the neutrality of creating happy people without appealing to conditional
choiceworthiness relations or implying weak repugnant conclusions.42
Rawls (1999, 25) argues that total utilitarianism fails to respect “the plurality of
distinct persons with separate systems of ends.” It does this by adding up different
people’s wellbeing. Rawls—rightly, I think—does not accuse average utilitarianism
of this mistake. Total utilitarianism views each person’s wellbeing as a distinct lo-
cation where the same quantity—good—is instantiated. Person-affecting theorists,
by contrast, view each person’s wellbeing as a distinct dimension of value: my good
and your good are different quantities, which cannot be “fused” together as if they
were the good of a single person (Rawls 24).43 The person-affecting theorist main-
tains that the only goodness is goodness for people, and that the bearer of value is
not the world, but the life. This seems to me a deep disagreement between average
and total utilitarianism.
Average utilitarianism can be impartial without being impersonal. This is reflected
in Harsanyi’s (1953) Rawlsian argument for average utilitarianism. The argument
says, roughly, that if we had an equal probability of living any life in a distribution
but would certainly exist, we ought to prefer a distribution with higher average
wellbeing for our own sakes, because this distribution would, in expectation, be
better for us. Therefore it is better. This reasoning is impartial, because we cannot
give preference to our own interests if we don’t know which interests are ours. And
yet the reasoning is not impersonal, because it does not appeal to any good that
42It is also, Bader points out, the transitive closure of his dominance relation.
43However, although these dimensions are distinct, they can be measured on the same scale.
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isn’t someone’s.
The textbook objection to this argument is that assuming our existence means that
our preference is not impartial. Parfit (1984, 392) makes this objection and at-
tributes it to Barry (1977, 317), who attributes it to Kavka (1975, 240). But no one
has substantiated it. Parfit compares the assumption of existence to assuming that
we are men when choosing between principles that would harm women. But as-
suming our sex violates impartiality because it allows us to know that we would
not, as Parfit says, “bear the brunt” of our choice. Nonexistence, however, is no
brunt to be borne: it couldn’t possibly be worse for us. Assuming ignorance of our
sex makes the choice impartial because it requires us to care about the interests of
the opposite sex. If some chosen principle harms women and we turn out to be
women, then we will be disadvantaged. But nonexistent people have no interests
for us to care about. If some chosen principle reduces the number of people and
we turn out not to exist, we will not be disadvantaged. So it is innocuous to assume
that we will certainly exist. Moreover, between whom or what could we be failing
to be impartial by making this assumption? Assuming our sex fails to be impartial
between people of different sexes—i.e., between men and women. But we cannot
fail to be impartial between existing and nonexistent people, because there are no
nonexistent people.44
Parfit presents another objection, which I discuss in Section 2.4. There are many
other objections to this argument, most of which are not specific to assuming
our own existence. I doubt that the thought experiment provides a non-question-
44I here ignore the view, shared by Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2015) and Fleurbaey and Voorho-
eve (2015), that existence can be better for someone than nonexistence.
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begging argument for average utilitarianism. But I think it reveals an important
aspect of average utilitarian reasoning—namely, that it is impartial without being
impersonal.
2.4 The Asymmetry
I have argued that average utilitarianism better explains the neutrality of creating
happy people thanBader’s view. Average utilitarianism is supported by an impartial
person-affecting view and is no less plausible than Bader’s method of balancing. If
we accept independence of the unaffected, as Bader should do in order to avoid
the deontic Egyptology objection, then we obtain strong deontic neutrality: mere
addition is always permissible and never obligatory.
The most decisive objections to average utilitarianism involve lives that are worth
not living. For example:
A = (−10,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω)
B = (−10,−9,−9, . . . ,−9)
Average utilitarianism says that B is better than A. That is absurd.
Bader has an independently justified account of the wrongness of bringing miser-
able lives into existence, which I mentioned on page 44. His account is deontic
rather than axiological: he does not say that it is worse for such lives to exist than
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not to exist. He can use this account to explainwhy it is wrong to chooseB. Because
Bader’s asymmetry is deontic, he cannot say that B is worse than A. But this would
not bother him, because on his view, the betterness relation between distributions
just is a betterness relation between lives, and the B-lives are indeed better than the
A-lives. The hellish objections to average utilitarianism need not bother Bader. So
Bader should still become an average utilitarian.
However, many of us do not have a deontic account of the asymmetry up our
sleeves, and we find it crazy to say that B is better than A. Nonetheless, I think
it would be premature to reject the relevance of average wellbeing entirely, given
the independently plausible asymmetry between good lives and bad lives: we are
neutral about making happy people, but we are against making miserable people.
We should not, therefore, expect to treat good lives and bad lives symmetrically. In
the previous section, I explained how a version of average utilitarianism captures
the first part of this asymmetry: the neutrality of bringing happy people into ex-
istence. In this section, I focus on the second part: the wrongness or badness of
bringing miserable people into existence.
On page 67, I mentioned Harsanyi’s argument for average utilitarianism. I rejected
the textbook objection that it violates impartiality to assume our own existence.
Parfit’s other objection to the argument is that it gives absurd results in hellish
cases, like A and B above. The argument asks us not to care about the existence
of additional people whose lives are worth not living, if their existence improves
our prospects from behind the veil of ignorance. But I wonder if the argument can
be revised to account for this problem. The standard version of the argument asks
us what ought to be preferred for the sake of anonymous person who will certainly
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exist. This question is important because such a preference is impartial without
being impersonal. But we can reasonably add that it is morally wrong to prefer B to
A, or to choose a principle or policy that leads to B, even for the sake of an anony-
mous existent. It is wrong because many more people’s lives are worth not living
in B, and this is not outweighed by the improvement in an anonymous person’s
prospects.
Deontic constraints can sometimes affect which preferences we ought to have even
for our own sakes. For example, it might be expectably better for someone if her
wealthy grandfather died prematurely, leaving her with a massive inheritance; but
it is wrong for her or anyone else to prefer, even for her sake, that her grandfather
die prematurely. I do not have an account of why it is wrong to prefer, even for
one’s own sake, that more people have lives worth not living. But it is clearly wrong.
And if we think the better outcome is the one that ought to be preferred from an
impartial perspective, then the morally permissible preferences that we ought to
have for the sake of an anonymous person might be a good guide to betterness.45
One way of drawing this asymmetry might be
Asymmetric Utilitarianism: If A has negative average wellbeing and B does not,
then A is worse than B. If neither A nor B has negative average wellbeing,
then the better one is the one with greater average wellbeing. If both A and B
have negative average wellbeing, then A is better than B iff A contains greater
total wellbeing than B.46
45This would require abandoning the hope that we can derive derive all moral principles from
impartial self-interest. I have no such hope.
46This statement would need to be revised in infinite cases.
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This theory draws an asymmetry between good lives and bad lives. It is indepen-
dently plausible that there is some such asymmetry, although I have no argument
for why it should be this one. The theory ranks all nonnegative distributions above
all negative ones, and then ranks nonnegative distributions by their averages and
negative distributions by their sums.47
Other versions of asymmetric utilitarianism are possible. For example,
Negativist Asymmetric Utilitarianism: If the lives in A are, on balance, worth
not living, and the lives in B are, on balance, at least neutral, then A is worse
than B. If the lives in both A and B are, on balance, at least neutral, then A
is better than B iff the lives in A are, on average, better than the lives in B. If
the lives in both A and B are, on balance, worth not living, then A is better
than B iff B contains a greater sum of uncompensated suffering than A.
Following Parfit (1984, 408), I say that a life’s suffering is uncompensated if the life is
worth not living. A distribution’s sum of uncompensated suffering is the total bad-
ness of its bad lives. Negativist asymmetric utilitarianism is just like asymmetric
utilitarianism, but its total utilitarian component for bad distributions cares only
about lives that are worth not living. Another variant is
Extreme Asymmetric Utilitarianism: If A contains a greater sum of uncompen-
sated suffering than B, then A is not at least as good as B. If, in addition, A
contains less total or average wellbeing than B, then A is worse than B. If,
47Parfit (1984, sec. 138) discusses views that treat happiness and suffering asymmetrically, but
his objections only apply to views on which happiness has diminishing marginal value.
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however, A contains greater total and average wellbeing than B, then A is
neither worse than nor at least as good as B: they are on a par. If A doesn’t
contain a greater sum of uncompensated suffering than B, then A is better
than B iff the lives in A are, on average, better than the lives in B.
Extreme asymmetric utilitarianism says that a greater sum of uncompensated suf-
fering (regardless of the overall wellbeing of the population) can never be out-
weighed by increases in total or average wellbeing.
All three views give the right result in the case on page 69: B is worse than A. But
I shall stick with the simpler view above—plain-vanilla asymmetric utilitarianism.
Let me mention three problems with the view.
First, asymmetric utilitarianism implies the sadistic conclusion, which I stated on
page 15. It says that C, below, is better than D:
C = (10,−5,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω)
D = (10, 1, 1, 1, . . . , 1)
This view says that we only consider the averages because both distributions are
good overall. So, if there are enough people in D, C is better.
Independence of the unaffectedmight soften this blow. It allows us, when choosing
between C and D, to ignore the first person and focus only on the subdistributions
below:
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C′ = (−5,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω)
D′ = (1, 1, 1, . . . , 1)
D′ is better than C′ according to asymmetric (and standard average) utilitarianism.
So we ought not to bring the miserable life into existence.
However, this strategy can be easily nullified:
C = (10,−5,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω)
D′′ = (11, 1, 1, 1, . . . , 1)
Asymmetric utilitarianism implies that C is better than D′′. We cannot appeal to
independence of the unaffected in this case. Negativist asymmetric utilitarianism
doesn’t help either. Extreme asymmetric utilitarianism implies thatC is worse than
D′′, because C has more uncompensated suffering and lower total wellbeing. But
extreme asymmetric utilitarianism also implies that E and F, below, are on a par:
E = (−1, 9, 9, 9, . . . , 9)
F = (1, 1, 1, 1, . . . , 1)
E has more uncompensated suffering because someone’s life is worth not living,
but has greater total and average wellbeing than F, so extreme asymmetric utilitari-
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anism says that E and F are on a par.48 Asymmetric utilitarianism, therefore, seems
either too averse or insufficiently averse to uncompensated suffering.
I find it more plausible that C is better than D′′ than that E isn’t better than F. Why
might we think that C cannot be better than D′′? We might think that miserable
life in C makes it worse than any distribution containing only lives worth living.49
But there must be limits to the wrongness or badness of bringing miserable lives
into existence. Proponents of the procreative asymmetry owe an account of when
we can permissibly create miserable lives. For example, we need to explain why
our species can continue to reproduce, even though we know that we will certainly
bring more miserable lives into existence by doing so. Asymmetric utilitarianism
gives a crude account: we can add such lives whenever they bring about higher
average wellbeing (if the affected lives are good overall) or total wellbeing (if the
affected lives are bad overall) than the alternatives. Until we have a better account,
I think it would be premature to regard this objection as decisive.
Second, asymmetric utilitarianism makes comparability intransitive. Suppose that
your options are these:
G = (−1)
H = (1)
48It therefore violates Arrhenius’s (forthcoming) general non-extreme priority condition.
49Alternatively, we might focus on the fact that everyone who exists in both distributions is bet-
ter off in D′′. But this is partial person-affecting reasoning: it does not apply if we change which
lives are whose. Such reasoning may be attractive, but it faces major problems that I wish to avoid
here (Temkin 2012, ch. 12). Or we might think that D′′ is better than C because it contains much




Asymmetric utilitarianism says that G is worse than H and I. And it says that H
and I are incomparable, because the average wellbeing in I is undefined. So you
shouldn’t choose G, but it’s fine to choose I. This makes comparability intransitive:
H is comparable with G, which is comparable with I, but H is incomparable with I.
How bad is this result? I assumed on page 10 that comparability was transitive
only because it simplifies the distinction between incomparability and parity. But if
we can independently distinguish between these relations—as Rabinowicz (2012),
Chang (2002), and Carlson (2010) argue—then I would be happy to allow intransi-
tive comparability. Otherwise, this seems to me a major problem with asymmetric
utilitarianism.
Third, asymmetric utilitarianism implies negative analogues of the repugnant con-
clusion:50
−A = (−100,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω)
−Z = (−1,−1,−1, . . . ,−1)
Imagine that each location represents the welfare of ten billion people. Asymmet-
ric utilitarianism implies that −A is better than −Z because −A contains more total
wellbeing (assuming there are enough people in −Z). The negativist version has the
50See Carlson (1998).
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same implication, as does the extreme version because −Z contains a greater sum
of uncompensated suffering and less total wellbeing. If the −A-lives are sufficiently
horrible, this strikes me as repugnant, although much less so than the original re-
pugnant conclusion.
There are likely many other problems with the theory. It may give strange results
when average wellbeing hovers close to zero. Because it is a hybrid theory, it lacks
the intrinsic plausibility of its components and may be subject to the objections to
both. There may be more disastrous problems that I have not considered.
2.5 Conclusion
Asymmetric utilitarianism is a simple theory. It says that, conditional on lives not
being miserable, it is better if better lives are lived; otherwise, it is better if there is
more wellbeing. When combined with independence of the unaffected, it secures
both parts of the procreative asymmetry and avoids the deontic Egyptology objec-
tion. It avoids the repugnant conclusion and gives intuitive results in infinite cases
where total utilitarianism fails.
I do not endorse asymmetric utilitarianism. I think it would be better to have an
independently justified account, such as Bader’s, of the wrongness of creating mis-
erable lives. If this account is deontic, rather than axiological, and is silent on the
creation of happy lives, then we could combine it with average utilitarianism and
independence of the unaffected to obtain the asymmetry. The theory would then
have a simpler axiology. That is what I think Bader should do. But if such accounts
of the asymmetry do not succeed, then I think asymmetric utilitarianism, despite
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its problems, deserves serious consideration.
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3 Total Utilitarianism without Repugnance
Recall the mere addition paradox:
A = (100,Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω),
A+ = (100, 1, 1, . . . , 1),
Z = (2, 2, 2, . . . , 2)
In the previous chapters, I considered views on which A+ is not at least as good as
A. Critical-band utilitarianism says that A+ and Z are on a par with A. I agree with
Broome that this appeal to parity is objectionably ad hoc. Bader’s view says that A+
and Z are incomparable with A. This avoids Broome’s objections to critical-band
utilitarianism. But the view is problematic in other ways. It is designed to cap-
ture the intuitive neutrality of creating happy people. But this neutrality is more
plausibly explained by average utilitarianism, which has its own problems. My con-
clusion from these two chapters is that incommensurability in population ethics is
not plausibly explained by mere differences in population size, as Bader and pro-
ponents of critical-band utilitarianism propose.
In this chapter, I see what happens if we grant the mere addition principle: A+ is
at least as good as A. In Section 3.1, I consider two views that appeal to lexical
superiority in population ethics. In Section 3.2, I suggest that the objections to
lexical superiority can be mitigated by appealing to parity.
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3.1 Two Lexical Views
In order to avoid the conclusion that Z is better than A, these views must reject
non-anti-egalitarianism, which I stated on page 8: theymust say that Z is not better
than A, even though Z contains greater total and average wellbeing and has it more
equally distributed.
Parfit (2004) proposes such a view. According to
Parfit’s Perfectionism: “[E]ven if some change brings a great net benefit to those
who are affected, it is a change for the worse if it involves the loss of one of
the best things in life.” (19)
This is one version of
The Lexical View: There is some number of excellent lives whose existence would
be better than any number of mediocre lives, even though the existence of
eachmediocre life wouldmake things better, by some fixed amount that does
not depend on the number or wellbeing of other people.
This last clausemakes the lexical view relevantly different from variable value views,
on which the contributive value of a life depends on how many other people exist
and on how well off they are (Hurka 1983).
In this chapter, I defend a different version of the lexical view. It is simply a version
of total utilitarianism:
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Lexical Total Utilitarianism: A is better than B iff A contains a greater sum of
wellbeing. But a distribution in which enough people’s lives are excellent
contains a greater sumofwellbeing than any distribution inwhich everyone’s
lives are, at best, just barely worth living.
This view passes the buck of avoiding the repugnant conclusion to our theory of
wellbeing. It, therefore, differs from Parfit’s perfectionism. Parfit doesn’t think that
there is less wellbeing in a world with fewer of the best things in life. Instead, he
thinks that such a world isworse, even though itmay containmuchmore wellbeing.
These views differ in their responses to the mere addition paradox. I said that if
we grant the mere addition principle, then we can only avoid the conclusion that
Z is better than A by rejecting non-anti-egalitarianism. Just so, for Parfit’s perfec-
tionism. Lexical total utilitarianism, however, entails non-anti-egalitarianism: any
population with greater total wellbeing is better; equality has nothing to do with
it. So it cannot avoid the conclusion that Z is better than A. Doesn’t it, therefore,
entail the repugnant conclusion?
Not so fast. To obtain the repugnant conclusion, we have to assume that any ex-
cellent life is better than a mediocre life by some scalar quantity of wellbeing. For
example, we’ve been assuming since page 8 that a life at 100 is excellent and that a
life at 1 is barely worth living. This means that an excellent life is 100 times better
than a mediocre life. That is what our numbers mean. And that is why total utili-
tarianism seems to lead to the repugnant conclusion. If any excellent life is at most
n times better than any mediocre life, where n is a real number, then we obtain the
repugnant conclusion by adding at least n mediocre lives for every excellent life.
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But it is reasonable to deny that there is any such n. We could, I suppose, stipulate
that “100” is excellent and that “1” ismediocre. But then our scale would not reflect
how good a life really is. We could not say, for example, that Z contains a greater
sum of wellbeing than A+, even though the sum of the numbers assigned is greater.
Lexical total utilitarians reject that quantities of wellbeing are scalar quantities (as
defined on page 11). This is because the real numbers obey
TheArchimedean Property: For any scalar values x and y with x > 0, there is
some natural number n such that nx > y.
There might be real-valued ratios between some quantities of wellbeing—e.g., be-
tween any two excellent lives or any two mediocre lives. Our version of the mere
addition paradox above would then be operating within what Griffin (1988) calls a
“pocket of cardinality” (97). But the repugnant conclusion tries to connect differ-
ent pockets on a single cardinal scale, which lexical total utilitarians believe cannot
be done.
That is why lexical total utilitarians require incommensurability, as I said on page
12. They deny that the dimensions of wellbeing can be measured on a single car-
dinal scale. For then the Archimedean property would kick in, leading to the re-
pugnant conclusion. This is the sense in which Ross (2002, 150) thinks virtue to
be incommensurable, but comparable, with pleasure.51 This is a manifestation of
incommensurability that need not violate completeness. But I extend it to violate
completeness in Section 3.2.
51He later (1939) thinks they are incomparable, because they are good in different senses.
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Many theorists would independently reject the assumption that quantities of well-
being can be represented by single real numbers. Sen (1980), for example, argues
that wellbeing is fundamentally a vector quantity—i.e., representable as a list of
components. He thinks that even hedonists should accept this. Even if the vec-
tor’s components can be added or otherwise reduced to a scalar value, that should
be regarded as a special case and a substantive claim about wellbeing. Chipman
(1960) takes a similar view and goes so far as to define utility as a lexical ordering
represented by a vector. Like Sen, Chipman thinks that everyone should accept
this definition, even if they think that the components of the vector (or what he
calls the “lexical number”) can be summed together to form a scalar quantity.52
Sen’s and Chipman’s reasons have nothing to do with the repugnant conclusion.
So lexical total utilitarianism’s core move is not merely an ad hoc response to the
problems of population ethics; this cannot be said of many other views.
Here is a toy model of lexical total utilitarianism. We represent each person’s well-
being as a list of components, whose first component carries the more important
aspects of wellbeing (i), and whose second component carries the more trivial as-
pects (t).53 What are the important things? What are the trivial things? I don’t
know. I mention some broad possibilities through this chapter, but I don’t assume
any of them.
Suppose that the values of the important component can be represented by integers,
and that the values of the trivial components can be represented by real numbers,
with no upper and lower bound on either dimension. The sumof (i1, t1) and (i2, t2)
52Chipman would say that Broome’s (1991) definition is a special case.
53Here I follow Kitcher (2000).
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is (i1 + i2, t1 + t2). We now want a lexical ordering of these values. The standard
lexical ordering is
(iA, tA) ≥ (iB, tB) iff either
(a) iA > iB, or
(b) iA = iB and tA ≥ tB.
This means that any increase along the important dimension makes things better
overall, no matter how much worse things are along the trivial dimension. In Sec-
tion 3.2, I provide a more plausible partial ordering. But the standard ordering
suffices for now.
Say that a life is neutral if it has none of the important stuff (i = 0) and none of the
trivial stuff (t = 0), that a life is barely worth living iff it has none of the important
stuff (i = 0) and some of the trivial stuff (t > 0), and that a life is excellent only if it
has some of the important stuff (i > 0). In this model, the existence of any number
of excellent lives would be better than any number of lives that would be barely
worth living.
We should not read too much into this toy model. The whole idea behind lexical
total utilitarianism is that wellbeing is more complex than arguments for the re-
pugnant conclusion assume. Lexical total utilitarians should not make the same
mistake by thinking that wellbeing can accurately be represented by two numbers.
We should, therefore, remember that the model is an oversimplification.
I am not the first to suggest that total utilitarianism can avoid the repugnant con-
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clusion. This suggestion, or something like it, is mentioned by many others.54 But
many theorists seem either not to notice it or not to take it seriously: Cowen (1996),
Sider (1991), Arrhenius (2000), Parfit (2004), Huemer (2008), and Temkin (2012)
all assert that total utilitarianism entails the repugnant conclusion.55
This chapter makes two contributions to the literature on lexical total utilitarian-
ism. First, I explain why lexical total utilitarianism is more plausible than Parfit’s
perfectionism. In Section 3.1.1, I argue that lexical total utilitarianism provides a
better account the single-life repugnant conclusion, and in Section 3.1.2, I argue
that it better explains the repugnance of the (many-life) repugnant conclusion. In
Section 3.2, I suggest that lexical total utilitarians can avoid some of the objections
to their view by appealing to parity, in a way that avoids Broome’s objections dis-
cussed in Chapter 1. I think this view may identify the most plausible source of
incommensurability in population ethics.
3.1.1 Single-Life Repugnance
I begin with McTaggart’s version of
The Single-Life Repugnant Conclusion:
Take a life which in respect of knowledge, virtue, love, pleasure, and
intensity of consciousness, was unmixedly good, and possessed any
54See, for example, Griffin (1988), Crisp (1992), Portmore (1999), Kitcher (2000), Thomas
(manuscript), and Carlson (manuscript).
55Arrhenius (forthcoming) doesn’t consider this theory a version of total utilitarianism because it
implies that wellbeing cannot be represented on a single ratio scale. But this is an unduly restrictive
definition: it implies thatMill, asmany interpret him, couldn’t have been a total utilitarian. Also, see
Carlson (2007) for a simplemodel of additivemeasurement that violates theArchimedean property.
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finite degree of goodness you choose. Suppose this life prolonged for a
million years if you like without its value in any way diminishing. Take
a second life which had very little consciousness, and had a very little
excess of pleasure over pain, and which was incapable of virtue or love.
The value in each hour of its existence, though very small, would be
good and not bad. And there would be some finite period of time in
which its value would be greater than that of the first life, and another
period in which it would be a million times greater. (1927, 452–53)
McTaggart calls the longer life an “oyster-like” life. He accepts the single-life repug-
nant conclusion, although he notes that it would “be repugnant to certain moral-
ists.”
It is, I think, a desideratum of a solution to the repugnant conclusion that it can
be extended in a natural way to solve the single-life repugnant conclusion (or vice
versa). There are, of course, important differences between the two cases. For ex-
ample, there is someone for whom a longer life is better, but there might be no one
for whom a larger population is better. I don’t want to deny that this difference is
important, or to claim that these two repugnant conclusions should be avoided in
the exact same way. But there are important connections between them, too.
Here is one such connection. If the single-life repugnant conclusion is true, that
would make the many-life version much harder to reject. Suppose that the single-
life repugnant conclusion is true: for any life of finite length at some very high
welfare level, there is some oyster-like life that, because it would be much longer,
would be better. Then consider some very high welfare level a, for which it seems
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that any sufficiently large population at level a would be better than any number
of people living at some much lower level z. The single-life repugnant conclusion
implies that a sufficiently long oyster-like life could be at some level as high as, or
higher than, a. Now consider
TheMundane Conclusion: For any number of oyster-like lives, however long,
there is somemuch larger number of oyster-like lives whose existence would
be better, even though they are, because they are each much shorter, barely
worth living.
This claim does not strike me as repugnant. But the mundane conclusion and the
single-life repugnant conclusion (alongwith some other plausible assumptions) en-
tail the repugnant conclusion: for any number of lives at any welfare level, there is
some number of lives at some much lower (but still positive) welfare level whose
existence would be better. Take some finite population of lives at any welfare level,
however high. This population would be worse than some population of very long
oyster-like lives. This follows from the single-life repugnant conclusion and
TheWeak Impartial Pareto Principle: For any populations A and B of the same
size, if everyone in A is better off than everyone in B, then A is better than B.
Because each oyster-like life would be better than each life of very high quality,
the weak impartial Pareto principle implies that the population of oyster-like lives
is better. And this population would, in turn, be worse than some much larger
number of shorter oyster-like lives, each of which would be barely worth living. So,
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by transitivity, for any finite population of lives at any welfare level, however high,
there is some larger population whose existence would be better, even though each
of its members lives a very short oyster-like life.
In order to reject the standard repugnant conclusion, we should reject either the
single-life repugnant conclusion, the mundane conclusion, or the weak impartial
Pareto principle. The single-life repugnant conclusion is, I think, the most implau-
sible of these claims.
Here is one way of highlighting the implausibility of rejecting themundane conclu-
sion while accepting the single-life repugnant conclusion: we increase the size of
the oyster-like population in cheesy ways that also reduce the lifespan of its mem-
bers. The strategy here depends on one’s views about personal identity, and not all
views will permit such a strategy. I shall illustrate it with a variation on a case due
to Parfit (1984, 299):
Amoeba Z: In A, the oyster-like beings each live for n years (where n is enough
to make their lives very well worth living, by the single-life repugnant con-
clusion). In Z, the oyster-like beings reproduce by dividing, like amoebae.
They divide at regular intervals much shorter than n—so short that each life
is just barely worth living. Because they divide so often, there are vastlymore
beings in Z than there are in A.
It seems to me that amoeba Z could easily be better than A. Although the division
process makes each life, from one fission to another, much shorter and less worth
living, that doesn’t seem to make Z much worse. We could even imagine that each
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post-fission descendant is psychologically and physically extremely similar to its
ancestor. At any single time, the only difference between A and amoeba Z would
be that the latter containsmanymoreminds experiencing the same simple pleasure.
This makes the mundane conclusion seem very plausible to me. So I think that the
single-life andmany-life repugnant conclusions stand or fall together. I don’t have a
non-question-begging argument for the mundane conclusion that would convince
theorists who are already convinced of some conflicting population axiology. But
it is clearly not repugnant, and that datum needs to be explained.
Lexical total utilitarianism explains it as follows. The mundane conclusion is true,
because this version of Z contains a greater sum of trivial goods than A. The single-
life repugnant conclusion is false, because the oyster-like life fails to instantiate the
more important dimensions of wellbeing. That is why it is barely worth living. Ex-
tending such a life by millions of years cannot make it excellent. In our toy model,
extending this life just multiplies 0 by a large number. And the repugnant conclu-
sion is false, because no number of oyster-like lives could contain a greater sum of
wellbeing than a population of excellent lives. No real number reflects how much
better an excellent life is than an oyster-like life.
I don’t mean to imply that the aggregation of goods within each life is exactly the
same as the aggregation of goods across lives. There may, for example, be interac-
tion effects between goods. McTaggart asks us to suppose, for instance, that the
first life in his comparison is good with respect to “knowledge, virtue, love, plea-
sure, and intensity of consciousness.” But what if we instead split these goods up,
so that each of five people enjoyed one of these things and had none of the others?
It would not be clear to me that each of these people’s lives would be better than
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any oyster-like life, however long. Nor would it be clear tome that those lives taken
together would be better than any number of oyster-like lives. But this suggests to
me not that the lexical diagnosis is wrong, but rather that we need to be careful
about what makes some lives lexically better than others. What makes lives most
worth livingmay involve organic unities or patterns within a life. Parfit (1984, 502),
for example, suggests that what makes someone’s life go best is wanting and taking
pleasure in certain (rational, loving, and aesthetic) activities. The right kind of
combination of desire, pleasure, and activity is, on this view, much more valuable
than each of these things taken separately.
Griffin (1988, 34f.) argues, more generally, that wellbeing is not an additively sep-
arable function of various goods. He suggests a global view of wellbeing (Crisp
1992), on which we cannot determine the value of a life simply by looking at goods
in isolation. This view is compatible with lexical total utilitarianism. Lexical total
utilitarianism requires that the value of a distribution be an additively separable
function of the wellbeing of its members. But it does not require the wellbeing of
its members to be an additively separable function of various goods (e.g., pleasures
and accomplishments). Lexical total utilitarianism may seem incompatible with
the global view because I have been representing the goodness of lives and distri-
butions as lists with multiple components. But I haven’t said what the components
are or how lives can be better or worse in terms of them. The important dimensions
could be global properties of lives. That seems, for example, to be Broad’s (1938)
solution to the single-life repugnant conclusion: the shorter life’s “elaborate tem-
poral pattern” makes it like “the performance of an opera,” whereas the oyster-like
life “is like a single note played . . . on a single very simple instrument such as a
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tin-whistle” (688).
What is the perfectionist diagnosis of the single-life repugnant conclusion? For
simplicity, let’s assume that knowledge, virtue, and love—the things in the shorter
life imagined byMcTaggart—are perfectionist goods (i.e., some of the best things in
life). Whether or not Parfit can appeal to such perfectionist goods in order to avoid
the single-life repugnant conclusion depends on whether Parfit sees perfectionist
goods as ingredients of welfare or as impersonal ideals (or both). By ingredients of
welfare, I mean the kinds of things that make someone’s life go well, and are good
for her. By impersonal ideals, I mean the kinds of things that are supposed to make
worlds good, without necessarilymaking themgood for anyone. If the perfectionist
goods aremerely impersonal ideals, then Parfit’s perfectionism cannot explain why
we should reject the single-life repugnant conclusion. That’s because the single-life
repugnant conclusion is a judgment about the goodness of lives. The most that
Parfit could say is that a world in which the shorter life exists would be better than
one in which any oyster-like life exists. But it seems to me not just that it’s better
if the shorter life exists, but also that the shorter life is a better life: it has a higher
lifetime wellbeing, and if one could live either the shorter life or the oyster-like life,
one should prefer to live the shorter one for one’s own sake.
Suppose, then, that Parfit sees his perfectionist goods as ingredients of welfare, and
as being lexically superior to the mild pleasures of the oyster-like life. He can then
avoid the single-life repugnant conclusion by appealing to his perfectionist theory.
But then his view would be compatible with lexical total utilitarianism. Perfec-
tionism would simply identify what makes some quantities of wellbeing lexically
greater than others. Combining a perfectionist theory of wellbeing with the struc-
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ture of lexical total utilitarianism would allow Parfit to avoid the single-life and
many-life repugnant conclusions, without violating non-anti-egalitarianism.56
Parfit may have several reasons for rejecting the lexical total utilitarian construal of
perfectionism. One reasonmight be tomake his lexical view compatible withmany
different theories of wellbeing. For example, although some hedonists follow Mill
in holding that pleasures of certain qualities are lexically superior to others, many
would reject this view. And Parfit seems to think, or at least to hope, that the solu-
tions to the problems of population ethics do not depend on our views about well-
being. But it seems to me that the plausibility of different methods of aggregating
“the amount of whatever makes life worth living” (Parfit 1984, 387) may depend on
what one thinks makes life worth living. Some views of wellbeing—e.g., views that
value only the nonfrustration of preferences—have clear implications for popula-
tion ethics.57 We shouldn’t reject an otherwise attractive population axiology just
because it is less plausible according to certain theories of wellbeing. Indeed, it is
progress to discover that different theories stand or fall together.
Parfit might reject my diagnosis of the single-life repugnant conclusion because he
distinguishes between quality of life and quantity of wellbeing (manuscript). He
gives an example in which the best things in x’s life are of a higher quality than the
best things in y’s, but where x’s life is worse because it is much shorter. This distinc-
tion might be what Parfit has in mind in his diagnosis of the single-life repugnant
conclusion: “The Century of Ecstasy would be better for me in an essentially qual-
itative way. Though each day of the Drab Eternity would have some value for me,
56This would also make an additional non-welfarist construal of perfectionism redundant.
57See, e.g., Fehige’s contribution to Fehige and Wessels (1998).
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no amount of this value could be as good for me as the Century of Ecstasy” (2004,
18).58
However, I do not understand Parfit’s distinction between quality of life and quan-
tity of wellbeing. In Parfit’s example, the things in x’s life are of a higher quality
than the things in y’s. But x’s life is worse, so she has lower lifetime wellbeing. It
seems to me that the quality of someone’s life is just how good or bad it is: if x’s
life is worse than y’s, then it is of lower quality. If x’s life is also shorter, then it
might be true that, during each period of x’s life, x enjoy a greater quality of life.
But this is a judgment about momentary wellbeing, not about lifetime wellbeing. I
cannot intelligibly distinguish between the quality of an entire life and the quantity
of lifetime wellbeing. Similarly, it seems to me that if no amount of a drab eternity’s
value could be as good as a century of ecstasy, then no amount of this value could
be as much value for someone as a century of ecstasy. I do not understand the view
that a century of ecstasy would be better, but would have less value, than a drab
eternity. Quantities of wellbeing just are, as I understand them, qualities of life.
There are, of course, other responses to the single-life repugnant conclusion. We
might, for example, think that the shorter life is better because pleasure has di-
minishing marginal value for the person experiencing it. I do not find this very
58Parfit also says, in endnote 3, “These remarks assume that the quality of life is higher if people’s
lives go better, and that each life goes better if it contains a greater quantity either of happiness or
of whatever else makes life worth living. ‘Quality’ thus means ‘quantity, per life lived’. In Section
5 below,” where he discusses the single-life repugnant conclusion, “I drop this assumption, thereby
simplifying the contrast between quality and quantity. (If this note is puzzling, ignore it.)” Simi-
larly, McTaggart thought that those who would reject the single-life repugnant conclusion would be
motivated by “a conviction that quality is some thing which is inherently and immeasurably more
important than quantity” (453). Kagan (1994) distinguishes between a person’s wellbeing and her
quality of life. I agree that persons are importantly distinct from their lives. But even Kagan (2009,
271) now rejects his earlier conclusion.
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plausible, but I shall not argue against it here. My claim in this section is merely
that it is reasonable to take a lexical view about quantities of wellbeing in light
of the single-life repugnant conclusion. This gives lexical total utilitarianism an
independent motivation that perfectionism lacks. If perfectionist goods are im-
personal ideals, then perfectionism seems not to explain the single-life repugnant
conclusion. If they are ingredients of welfare, then Parfit should accept lexical total
utilitarianism.59
3.1.2 Repugnance
What is repugnant about the repugnant conclusion? According to Parfit, the re-
pugnant conclusion is hard to accept because, in Z, “people’s lives are barely worth
living, and most of the good things in life are lost” (208). But, as Ryberg (1996)
argues, this diagnosis seems not to fully explain the repugnance of the repugnant
conclusion.
Ryberg’s argument appeals to a version of Z in which the best things in life are not
lost. He considers a world in which people’s lives are mostly mediocre, but they
contain both glimmers of excellence and some sprinkles of great evil. Ryberg sug-
gests, for example, that they might contain “an experience of Mozart’s music but
also the experience of undergoing a serious operation without anaesthetic” (208).
Ryberg says that the worst things in life “have the same numerical value as higher
positive values (surely it is reasonable to think that there are such higher negative
59Reflection on the nature of welfare may lead us to lexical total utilitarianism in other ways. List
(2004) presents an analogue of Arrow’s theorem for multidimensional theories of wellbeing. We
might become lexical total utilitarians because we accept interpersonal but not interdimensional
comparisons of wellbeing.
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values)” (ibid.). He imagines that these great evils cancel out the higher goods,
making their lives just barely worth living. So it is a version of Z. And presum-
ably it would be repugnant to conclude that this version of Z is better than A. But
Parfit’s diagnosis of the repugnant conclusion seems not to apply to this case. In
this version of Z, most of the good things in life are not lost. They are just thinly
spread and counterbalanced by evils.
I have doubts about Ryberg’s appeals to one-off tastes of higher goods. If the best
things in life were things like listening to Mozart, then it would be clear that these
things could, in principle, be enjoyed in tiny doses. But those doses would not do
much to make life worth living. It is more plausible to value the appreciation of
Mozart. Appreciation—at least, the kind that it is plausible to assign great value—
requires more than mere listening, and even more than enjoyment, but also recog-
nition of why the thing is worth enjoying. Such recognition may require a back-
ground of knowledge and other experiences—e.g., having listened to Mozart’s pre-
decessors and successors. And if one has the kind of knowledge and experience
that makes one able to appreciate something in a valuable way, then one has al-
ready achieved some (perhaps lesser) perfections.
However, even if we reject Ryberg’s particular claims about his version of Z, we
could imagine a sufficiently similar version of Z. Some Holocaust survivors, for in-
stance, have claimed that their lives were, on the whole, barely worth living (Hayes
2015, 779). Imagine a person who, after years in a concentration camp, is liberated
and has a good future: she starts a new family, experiences some of the best things
in life, and is, when not remembering her past, happy. It is reasonable to think that
at least some lives of this kind are barely worth living; some people who have led
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such lives have thought so. If they are right, then Ryberg’s version of Z might be
populated by many such lives. It is repugnant to conclude that this world is better
than a much smaller one in which there are no concentration camps. But this re-
pugnance cannot be explained by the absence of the best things in life, because the
best things in life are present in this Z, and perhaps in greater quantities than in A.
I don’t think this objection to Parfit’s perfectionism is decisive: Parfit could perhaps
give a different diagnosis of Ryberg’s case. But a unified explanation would bemore
satisfying.
Lexical total utilitarianism offers a different diagnosis. On this theory, the repug-
nant conclusion is false because, no matter how big Z is, there is less wellbeing in
Z than in A. The repugnance lies in the conception of wellbeing required for Z to
contain more wellbeing than A. The value of a life cannot be reduced to a single
real number. When explaining why total utilitarianism entails the repugnant con-
clusion, Parfit (1984) compares Z to “a heap of bottles each containing only a single
drop” of milk (338). But wellbeing is, in this way, unlike milk.
This diagnosis also applies toRyberg’s version ofZ. Ryberg characterizes the lives in
his Z as being, overall, neutral in the important ways—because they don’t contain
a surplus of either higher positive or negative values—and good in the trivial ways.
That is why the lives are just barely worth living. Lexical total utilitarianism implies
that no population of such lives could contain more wellbeing than a population
of lives that go well in the important ways.
We might, however, suspect that other versions of the repugnant conclusion will
slip through the cracks of lexical total utilitarianism. This would be true if the
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most important dimensions of wellbeing, or the higher goods, can come in very
small degrees. For we could then imagine a vast population of people who barely
instantiate the important goods. Suppose, with Ross, that virtue is good for its own
sake and lexically superior to pleasure.60 Now consider a world in which billions of
people are highly virtuous. Is there some number of people whose existence would
be better, even though each person is only slightly virtuous? The affirmative answer
seems no less repugnant than the initial repugnant conclusion. But, on one way of
aggregating virtue, there is more virtuous activity in the more populous world.
One way of answering this objection would be to posit lexical superiorities within
dimensions or goods. Wemight think, for example, that no number of barely virtu-
ous people would instantiate or manifest as much virtue as a sufficient number of
truly noble people. Many havemade similar claims about other goods or evils. Gur-
ney (1887), for example, claims that no duration of moderate pain would be worse
than torture. Some might hold analogous views about the goodness of knowledge.
On one view of this kind, knowledge is good for its own sake, but some kinds of
knowledge are lexically superior to others. For example, some fundamental phys-
ical laws or moral truths may be more worth knowing than any number of facts
about grains of sand on beaches.
The objection could also be avoided by views on which the more important di-
mensions of wellbeing are discrete. The objection is strongest for values that are
structurally like the real numbers. For then the Archimedean property kicks in to
generate repugnant conclusions. If the values along the important dimension are
60I here ignore that Ross’s notion of goodness is not a notion of wellbeing; it is a property of facts,
not of lives.
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discrete, like the integers, then it is easier to avoid such conclusions. The simplest
case, discussed by Kitcher (2000), would be a binary dimension. For example, the
lives that are most worth living might be ones that are meaningful or free.61 Al-
though people can be more or less free and have more or less meaningful lives, we
might care most about the binary question—i.e., whether we are free, or whether
our lives havemeaning. (Thismay be like the way in which some people caremuch
more about not becoming bald than about having less hair.) We might think that
a world filled with enough free agents or meaningful lives, if they are sufficiently
happy, contains more of what makes live worth living than a world filled with any
number of unfree agents living meaningless lives, however happy they are.
As these remarks suggest, I don’t think that lexical total utilitarianism’s avoidance of
seemingly repugnant conclusions is a fait accompli. Much depends on our theory of
whatmakes life worth living. If, for example, we are hedonists who reject the lexical
priority of any pleasures or pains, then we cannot avoid the repugnant conclusion
by appealing to lexical total utilitarianism. But I am not confident that population
axiology and the theory of wellbeing can be successfully pursued independently of
each other.
3.2 The LexicalThreshold
I have argued that lexical total utilitarianism better explains the repugnance of both
the single- and many-life repugnant conclusions. It also entails the eminently plau-
sible non-anti-egalitarian principle. It has other advantages, too, which I shall
61On meaning, meaningfulness, and worth, see Audi (2005), Frankfurt (1999 ch. 7), Smuts
(2013), and Wolf (2010). Mulgan (2006) proposes a lexical view that gives priority to freedom.
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not discuss: it strikes at a weak spot in Arrhenius’s (forthcoming) impossibility
theorems,62 its structure can accommodate lexical intuitions in fixed-population
cases,63 and it might avoid negative analogues of the repugnant conclusion.
In this part of the chapter, I discuss three of the most pressing objections to lexical
views. The first, pressed by Jensen (2008), is that lexical views are committed to an
implausibly strong form of lexical priority, on which any number of lives at some
level would be better than any number of lives at some other level. The second,
pressed by Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2005), is that they must assign lexical prior-
ity to lives that are only slightly better than the lives to which they are superior. And
the third, pressed by Huemer (2010), is that they have paradoxical implications in
cases of risk.
I argue that all three objections can be mitigated by accepting a threshold version
of lexical total utilitarianism, which appeals to parity.
3.2.1 Collapse
The lexical view leaves open the following question: is there some number of ex-
cellent lives whose existence would be worse than some number of mediocre lives?
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2005) distinguish between two kinds of lexical superi-
ority:64
62Carlson (manuscript) and Thomas (manuscript) show that Arrhenius’s case for assuming that
wellbeing levels are “discrete” ignores non-Archimedean theories of wellbeing. Without this as-
sumption, many of his arguments fail.
63For example, that no number of lollipop licks would outweigh the badness of one person’s
torture (Temkin 2012, 34).
64The earliest discussion of this distinction that I know of is by Laird (1936, 255), although not
with these names. Griffin (1988) emphasizes it under the names “trumping” and “discontinuity.”
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Strong Superiority: The Xs are strongly superior to the Ys iff any number of Xs
would be better than any number of Ys.
Weak Superiority: The Xs are weakly superior to the Ys iff there is some number
of Xs whose existence would be better than any number of Ys.
The lexical view only requires weak superiority, which is enough to avoid the repug-
nant conclusion. And strong superiority is implausible: it seems absurd to think
that even a single excellent life would be better than any number of mediocre lives.
This section is about a problem that arises if we accept weak but not strong superi-
ority. I suggest that we solve the problem by rejecting completeness.
One of the major advantages of the lexical view is its compatibility with plausible
independence principles about the contributive value of lives. This is, I think, its
main advantage over variable value views. The lexical view is compatible with
Separability of People: For any populations A and B, A is better than B iff, for any
population X, adding A to X would be better than adding B to X.65
We can think of X as a context of preexisting (or independently existing) people to
which we can add A or B. A is better than B iff it’s better to add A rather than B to
any such context.
One reason to reject separability would be if we viewed populations as organic uni-
ties (for example, Broad 1938, II:692). If populations were organic unities, then
65See Broome (2004 ch. 13) for a more precise formulation.
100
which of two expansions to the population would be better would plausibly de-
pend on what the rest of the population looks like. I have no objection to the view
that populations are organic unities, and I have no argument for separability. Sep-
arability is usually supported by appealing to versions of the Egyptology objection,
but I am only troubled by deontic versions of this objection, which can be avoided
by independence of the unaffected. Nonetheless, the most plausible version of the
lexical view would accept separability. For if separability is rejected, then the lexi-
cal view seems no more, and perhaps less, plausible than variable value views (e.g.,
Sider 1991). Moreover, total utilitarianism requires separability, and I have argued
that the most plausible lexical view is just a version of total utilitarianism. My aim
in this chapter is to develop the most plausible lexical view. So I shall assume sep-
arability.
Jensen (2008) argues, however, that if we assume separability, thenweak superiority
collapses to strong superiority. He proves that if at least as good as is transitive and
complete, then separability andweak superiority entail strong superiority. Suppose
that the A-lives are weakly but not strongly superior to the B-lives. For example,
suppose that 100 A-lives wouldn’t be better than 1 million B-lives, but that 200
A-lives would be better than any number of B-lives. Separability implies that 200
A-lives wouldn’t be better than 1million B-lives plus 100A-lives, and that 1million
B-lives plus 1 A-lives wouldn’t be better than 2 million B-lives. If at least as good
as is transitive and complete, then not better than would be transitive. So we could
conclude that 200A-liveswouldn’t be better than 2millionB-lives, contrary towhat
we have supposed.
If we reject completeness, however, not better than becomes intransitive: our
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slightly improved Bach on page 10 isn’t a greater genius than Einstein, who isn’t a
greater genius than Bach, but slightly improved Bach is a greater genius than Bach.
So we can maintain separability and weak superiority without strong superiority.
Nonetheless, we obtain a weaker result. We can distinguish between two kinds of
noninferiority:
Strong Noninferiority: The Xs are strongly noninferior to the Ys iff, for any num-
bers n and m, the existence of n Xs would not be worse than the existence of
m Ys.
Weak Noninferiority: The Xs are weakly noninferior to the Ys iff, for some n, the
existence of n Xs would not be worse than the existence of any number of m
Ys.
Strong noninferiority says that no amount of some lower good can outweigh any
amount of some higher good. Weak noninferiority says that some amount of some
higher good cannot be outweighed by any amount of some lower good.
Separability, weak superiority, and transitivity entail strong noninferiority.66 Sup-
pose that the A-lives are not strongly noninferior to the B-lives: there is some num-
ber m of B-lives whose existence would be better than some number n of A-lives.
We can then show by mathematical induction that, for any natural number q, the
existence of qm B-lives would be better than qn A-lives. The base case, in which
q = 1, is given: we have supposed thatm B-lives would be better than n A-lives. The
inductive step is that, for any natural number q, if qm B-lives would be better than
66The proof is similar to Jensen’s.
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qn A-lives, then (q+1)mB-lives would be better than (q+1)nA-lives. To prove the
inductive step, assume that qm B-lives would be better than qn A-lives. By separa-
bility, (q+1)m B-lives would be better than qn A-lives plus m B-lives: it is better to
add qm B-lives to a population of m B-lives than it is to add qn A-lives to that same
population. Moreover, the base case implies, by separability, that qn A-lives plus m
B-lives would be better than (q+1)nA-lives. By transitivity, (q+1)mB-lives would
be better than (q+1)n A-lives. This proves the inductive step. So, by mathematical
induction, for any q, qm B-lives would be better than qn A-lives. This means that
the A-lives cannot be weakly superior—or even weakly noninferior—to the B-lives.
For then there would be some number q such that qn A-lives would be better—
and, therefore, not worse—than any number, including qm, of B-lives. And we
have just shown that, without strong noninferiority, this is impossible. Therefore,
given separability, weak superiority requires strong noninferiority.
If we were to assume completeness, then strong noninferiority would be unsus-
tainable. For if the existence of any number of A-lives would not be worse than the
existence of any number of B-lives, and if not worse than implies at least as good as,
then, for any n and m, n A-lives would be at least as good as m B-lives. Take n = 1.
If a single A-life would be better than any number of B-lives, then we have strong
superiority. If a single A-life would be just as good as m B-lives, then we are in trou-
ble. According to lexical total utilitarianism, if the B-lives are worth living, then for
any m, m + 1 B-lives would be better than m B-lives. But if m + 1 B-lives would be
better than m B-lives, and if m B-lives would be just as good as a single A-life, then
m + 1 B-lives would be better than a single A-life. This contradicts strong noninfe-
riority, according to which no number of B lives would be better than any number
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of A-lives. So the only option consistent with strong noninferiority when an A-
life is at least as good as m B-lives is for the A-life to be better. Therefore, given
completeness and separability, strong noninferiority would collapse to to strong
superiority.
Proponents of the lexical view, therefore, have the following options. If they accept
separability and transitivity, they must accept strong noninferiority. If they also
accept completeness, they must accept strong superiority. And if they reject sep-
arability, they have little advantage over variable value views. It seems to me that
their best option is to accept separability and strong noninferiority, but to reject
completeness: strong superiority seems absurd.
Is strong noninferiority at all plausible? I think its plausibility largely depends on
one’s views aboutwellbeing and on the kinds of lives that are excellent. Manywould
independently accept that the best lives can’t be lived in isolation. On these views,
the best things in life involve things like mutual love, friendship, moral virtue, par-
ticipation in shared projects, and the achievement of shared goals. And these things
plausibly require the existence ofmany other peoplewho participate in these things.
On such views, strong noninferiority may not be too bad: it would be, for suffi-
ciently low numbers of people, a vacuous consequence of her theory of wellbeing.
I have suggested that lexical total utilitarians avoid strong superiority by rejecting
completeness. But I said on page 84 that lexical total utilitarians impose the follow-
ing ordering:
Standard Lexical Total Utilitarianism: A is at least as good as B iff either
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(a) iA > iB, or
(b) iA = iB and tA ≥ tB,
where iA is the sum of each A-person’s wellbeing in the important dimension(s),
and tA is the sum of each A-person’s wellbeing in the trivial dimension(s). This
ordering, however, implies strong superiority. If we reject strong superiority, we
can instead impose a lexical threshold:
Single-Threshold Lexical Total Utilitarianism: A is at least as good as B iff either
(a) iA − iB > Δ, or
(b) iA ≥ iB and tA ≥ tB.67
Here Δ represents a lexical threshold: it is the amount of some higher good needed
to outweigh any amount of the lower good.68 The standard lexical ordering is ob-
tained in the special case where Δ = 0. I assume that Δ is a finite value that doesn’t
vary with the population or other features of the distribution.69 The lexical thresh-
old makes it possible that neither of two populations is at least as good as the other,
because one might have less of the trivial stuff but not sufficiently more of the im-
portant stuff to exceed the lexical threshold. This might, for example, be a popula-
tion of one person whose life is great in every way that doesn’t require the existence
67Thanks to Teru Thomas for helping me formulate this.
68Mulgan (2006) uses “lexical threshold” differently, tomark the lower boundof lexically superior
lives.
69There might, however, be one threshold for ranking populations and another for evaluating
individual lives.
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of other people. This populationmight be on a par with, not better than, a vast pop-
ulation of oyster-like lives.
However, the partial ordering above has counterintuitive consequences when some
small gain along the important dimension is not enough to overcome the lexical
threshold. Such a gain cannot outweigh any loss along the trivial dimension, how-
ever great or small. The “however great” side of this coin is, at least, more plausi-
ble than the analogous implication of the standard lexical ordering, which implies
strong superiority. But the “however small” side has no appeal. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that A is better in the important ways than B, but not by enough to exceed
the lexical threshold (e.g., our one-person population), and that B is barely better
in the trivial ways (e.g., one short oyster-like life). The view under consideration
says that A is not at least as good as B. But that seems wrong.
We can fix this problem by imposing an additional threshold δ on the trivial dimen-
sion. We can represent B’s trivial gain as 0 < tB−tA < δ. Wemight say that A’s slight
edge over B along the important dimension (0 < iA − iB < Δ) outweighs this slight
loss along the trivial dimension. But, if the trivial loss were much greater, so that
it exceeded δ, then A would no longer be better than B, nor would A be worse. We
can define δ as the greatest quantity along the trivial dimension that would be out-
weighed by a quantity of exactly Δ along the important dimension: (Δ, 0) > (0, δ),
but (Δ, 0) ≯ (0, δ + ε), for any ε > 0. We might then formulate the partial ordering
as follows:
Multi-Threshold Lexical Total Utilitarianism: A is at least as good as B iff either
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(a) iA − iB > Δ, or
(b) iA ≥ iB, and
(i) tA ≥ tB, or





Condition (a) says that if A is better than B in the important ways by more than
Δ, then A is at least as good as B, no matter how much better B is in the trivial
ways. This secures weak superiority. (b) then states the two other ways in which
A might be at least as good as B. They both require A to be at least as good in the
important ways, thereby securing strong noninferiority. (b.i) says that if A is also
at least as good in the trivial ways, then A is at least as good as B. This secures the
tradeoff constraint, becauseA andBwill never be on a par unless each is better than
the other in some way—i.e., unless there is a tradeoff between the important and
trivial dimensions. (b.ii) matters when A is better than B in the important ways by
less than Δ, but worse than B in the trivial ways. It asks us to compare the ratio of
the differences along each dimension to the ratio of each dimension’s threshold. If
the ratio of the important gain to the trivial loss exceeds the ratio of Δ to δ, then A
is at least as good as B. This avoids the untoward consequence of single-threshold
lexical total utilitarianism: even small gains along the important dimension can
outweigh minuscule losses along the trivial dimension.
Threshold lexical total utilitarians accept weak superiority and strong noninferior-
ity. They reject completeness, which allows them to avoid the collapse to strong
superiority without violating separability. They think that dimensions of wellbe-
ing are incommensurable, first, because they cannot be measured on any scale of
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values that obeys the Archimedean property, and second, because some tradeoffs
between higher and lower goods result in parity. This kind of parity meets the
tradeoff constraint: it holds only when one distribution is worse in the trivial ways
and is only marginally better in the important ways. Threshold lexical total utili-
tarians think that some goods cannot substitute for, or compensate for the losses
of, other goods.
I argue below that threshold lexical total utilitarians can at least partially resolve
two of the most vexing problems for lexical views.
3.2.2 Marginal Differences
Lexical superiority is most plausible when there are differences in kind, not merely
of degree. But if the difference between excellent lives and mediocre lives is one of
degree, then lexical views may be implausible. They seem forced to draw a sharp
cutoff between excellence and mediocrity. But Parfit (2004, 20) points out that
there are “fairly smooth continua” between excellence (e.g., Mozart) and medi-
ocrity (e.g., muzak).
We might think that if there is a fairly smooth spectrum from one good to another,
then there is no difference in kind between them, because the slightest difference
in degree could not generate a difference in kind. But that would be tantamount
to the conclusion of a Sorites paradox. There is a fairly smooth spectrum ranging
from the hairy to the bald. It seems impossible that a slight change in the amount
or distribution of hair could generate a difference in kind—e.g., from the hairy to
the not-hairy, or from the not-bald to the bald. But that argument should not lead
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us to conclude that there is no difference between the hairy and the bald. Soritical
reasoning should not lead us to conclude that there is no difference in kind between
Mozart and muzak, or between the lives of flourishing human beings and those of
happy oysters or lizards.
We might, however, think that although there may be differences in kind between
items on a spectrum of marginal differences, the only axiologically relevant differ-
ences are the differences in degree on which the kind-differences supervene. On
this view, we should not give lexical weight to the seemingly arbitrary thresholds at
which a life becomes excellent, an insight becomes profound, some pain becomes
agony, or some creative work constitutes a work of genius. Goodness is a function
only of the comparative, degree-based properties in virtue of which things have
these vague, absolute properties.
Commonsense morality, however, gives great weight to properties with borderline
cases.70 For example, it may be morally wrong to harvest one innocent person’s vi-
tal organs in order to save two lives, butmorally obligatory to do so for the sake of a
million lives. We may have a duty to rescue a nearby child at little cost to ourselves,
but no duty to donate nearly all our resources to save a greater number of children
on another continent. It may be vague whether some act of consent was informed
and freely given, and therefore, sufficient to make some sexual act morally permis-
sible. It may be vague what one knows or intends, and yet the differences between
knowledge and ignorance, intent and foresight, may determine which actions are
negligent, which are reckless, which are warranted, which are blameworthy, and
which make one liable to be harmed.
70I borrow these examples from Alexander (2008).
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These examples, however, are deontic ones. It might be objected that although
binary judgments about permissibility and wrongness may depend on such prop-
erties, axiological ones about goodnessmay not. Butmany conceptions of the good
will confront similar cases. Lives containing both goods and evils may be on the
borderline between worth living and not worth living, and plausible non-hedonic
components of wellbeing—e.g., knowledge, love, and achievements—have border-
line cases. I also suggested on page 34 that population size can be vague because
of vagueness in personal identity, and that it can be vague whether something is
painful. It seems that we will inevitably have to give great weight in our axiology
to vague conditions, so this is problem is not unique to lexical views.
The problem, however, is not the existence of borderlines, but rather their signif-
icance for lexical superiority. Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2005, 136) prove the
following:
Suppose that at-least-as-good-as is a complete and transitive relation
on the domain. Then, in any finite sequence of objects in which the
first element is weakly superior to the last element, there exists at least
one element that is weakly superior to its immediate successor.
Arrhenius (2005) finds lexical superiority counterintuitive because he cannot
see how something could be even weakly superior to something that is “only
marginally worse” (108).
However, it must be shown that we can get from the superior object to the inferior
object in finitely many steps that are only marginally for the worse. The lexical
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theorist might claim that this is not true of her higher and lower goods. She might
claim that, in a finite sequence, some of the steps are more significant than they
might seem. For example, Griffin (1988, 339) suggests that “we might wish to stop
the slide . . . at that point along the linewhere people’s capacity to appreciate beauty,
to form deep loving relationships, to accomplish something with their lives beyond
just staying alive . . . all disappear.” The step from people with these capacities to
people without these capacities is, arguably, not a slight worsening.
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, however, might object that we could replace this all-or-
nothing step with a longer, finite sequence of lives where each step is less obviously
significant. Capacities come in degrees. So we might start with people who have
all of Griffin’s capacities and gradually reduce them until they disappear. But if
our theory assigns lexical superiority to discrete elements—e.g., personal capacities
or loving relationships—we might reasonably care much more about the binary
presence or absence of those elements than about their gradual waxing or waning.
(We should also care about the quality of these things. But increases or decreases
in quality might only matter above some threshold where the good exists.) And
this binary question may be vague. If the lexical superiority of certain objects in
a sequence depends on the lexical superiority of some discrete attribute, then it
ought to be vague where the lexical superiority sets in.
This may still seem incredible. Even if it’s vague which element in a sequence is
weakly superior to its immediate successor, it may seem absurd that there could
be such an element. Fortunately, threshold lexical total utilitarianism allows us to
further weaken this result, by rejecting completeness. Arrhenius and Rabinowicz
prove the following:
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Suppose that at-least-as-good-as is a transitive relation. If the first ele-
ment in a finite sequence of objects is [weakly noninferior] to the last
element, then there must exist some element in that sequence that is
[weakly noninferior] to its immediate successor. (137, n. 16)
This is not, I think, a shocking result. Noninferiority between immediate neighbors
along a sequence is still a cost of the lexical view (especially given our earlier result
that, given separability, weak noninferiority implies strong noninferiority). But it
is far easier to bear than if we had assumed completeness.
The combination of vagueness and incompleteness suggests a somewhat smoother
picture than the lexical view may have initially seemed. Excellent lives are weakly
superior to mediocre lives. Had we assumed completeness, there would have to
be some life along a finite spectrum from excellent lives to mediocre ones that is
weakly superior to its immediate successor. If we reject completeness, this life may
instead be only noninferior to its successor, and it may be vague which lives are
noninferior to their successors.
Broome objects to combinations of vagueness and parity. We saw in Section 1.4
that Broome’s objection to this combination fails, but that it might survive in a
limited form. The multidimensional collapsing principle stated on page 36 would
rule out combinations of vagueness and parity due to the imprecise weights of con-
flicting dimensions. This might endanger appeals to parity that meet the tradeoff
constraint. Is this a problem for threshold lexical total utilitarianism?
It depends on the breadth of the multidimensional collapsing principle. The vague-
ness suggested here is not explained by vagueness in the weights of conflicting di-
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mensions: one dimension is non-vaguely more important, or weightier, than the
other. The vagueness is multidimensional in some sense: it only arises because
there are multiple dimensions of wellbeing. But the vagueness lies in the value of
the lexical threshold(s), and Constantinescu’s proposal is restricted to vagueness
in the relative weights of conflicting dimensions. If we had an argument for the
multidimensional collapsing principle, we could examine whether this argument
rules out the threshold lexical total utilitarian’s combination of vagueness and par-
ity. But I had no argument for the principle. The closest I had was a question
about the same phenomenon—imprecisely weighted dimensions of value—giving
rise to two suspiciously similar relations. And there are two distinct phenomena
here. Parity arises because some losses cannot be compensated by any gains; the
higher goods are nonsubstitutable. But the magnitude of an important loss needed
to outweigh any trivial gains is vague, due to vagueness in the lexical threshold(s).
So I suspect that threshold lexical total utilitarianism avoids both the arbitrariness
and vagueness objections.
3.2.3 Uncertainty
In general, lexical views face problems in cases of uncertainty. Such problems have
been most developed in the context of population ethics by Huemer (2010), so I
focus on his discussion.
Huemer argues that lexical views in population ethics give “paradoxical” results
in cases of risk (333). His argument is aimed at Parfit’s perfectionism, but we can
here interpret perfectionism as a lexical view about wellbeing, which we can plug
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into lexical total utilitarianism. This interpretation is harmless, because Huemer’s
objection should apply to any lexical view. Huemer offers the following case:
The Two-Charity Case:
Suppose you have a large sum of money that you intend to donate to
a charitable cause. Your only concern is that the money should do
the most good. Two causes have attracted your attention. On the one
hand, you could donate the money to a poverty relief organization,
which you know will result in a large improvement to the welfare of
many people who presently have only barely worthwhile lives. On the
other hand, you could donate the money to an art school to enable it
to expand its operations searching for and supporting unrecognized
artistic talent. In the latter event, there is a probability p that, as a
result of your support, a new artistic masterpiece would be produced.
It seems that, on Parfit’s Perfectionist view, if p = 1, it would be best
to donate to the art school, regardless of how many people would be
aided by the poverty relief organization. (338)
Huemer then asks,
Huemer’s Question: For what values of p would this remain true?
Before discussing possible answers to this question, let memention some problems
with the example that we may need to fix. First, alleviating poverty has some prob-
ability of causing someone to produce a new artistic masterpiece. If we do enough
114
good for enough people, this probability could exceed some low values of p. Sec-
ond, alleviating povertymaybring about other perfectionist goods and reduce great
suffering, which could plausibly outweigh the production of a single artistic mas-
terpiece. I am, therefore, not confident that Parfit’s perfectionism would give the
verdict that Huemer assumes it would, even when p = 1. And I find it hard to con-
trol for these factors by mere stipulation. It is easiest to secure Huemer’s verdict if
we instead suppose that the relief organization alleviates some minor discomfort
of, or bestows some minor pleasure on, some vast number of people. The relief
organization might, for example, supply minuscule tubes of anti-itch ointment or
tasty lollipops. This makes it more reasonable to donate to the art school when
p = 1, and to think that lexical views would recommend doing so.
Return to Huemer’s question. Huemer considers three possible answers:
The Risk-Intolerant View: For any p > 0, it would be best to donate to the art
school, regardless of how many people would be aided by the poverty relief
organization.
The Risk-Tolerant View: For any p < 1, there is some number of people who
would be aided by the poverty relief organization such that it would be best
to donate to that organization.
TheThreshold View: There is some probability 0 < p < 1 above which it would be
best to donate to the art school, regardless of the number of people aided by
the poverty relief organization, and below which it would be better to donate
to the poverty relief organization.
Huemer then points out a problem for each view. The problem for the risk-
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intolerant view is that it seems to imply that it would be best for us to donate all
our charitable resources to (not-so-starving) artists—even those with a vanish-
ingly small, but nonzero, probability of churning out a masterpiece—and none
to improving the welfare of the least well off. The problem for the risk-tolerant
view is that it would make the lexical view irrelevant to practical deliberation,
because we are never certain that some action would lead to the creation of a
masterpiece. The problem for the threshold view is more complicated. It has to do
with conjunctions. Suppose, in
TheThree-Charity Case, that there are two art schools. You know that each one
has a probability slightly less than p of producing a masterpiece. If you were
to donate to them both, the probability of a masterpiece being produced
would exceed p.
Huemer points out that, according to the threshold view, it would be best for you
to donate to both art schools. But each donation, considered separately, would be
worse than a donation to some effective poverty relief organization. This violates
Huemer’s principle that
TwoWrongs Don’t Make a Right: If it is inappropriate for S to do A whether or
not S does B, and it is inappropriate for S to do B whether or not S does A,
then it is inappropriate for S to do A and B.71
71This should be restricted to finite sets of options, in order to avoid the problems raised by
Arntzenius, Elga, and Hawthorne (2004). The (“whether or not”) clauses are needed to avoid prob-
lems of the kind raised by Jackson (1985, 189).
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Huemer leaves the notion of “inappropriateness” very broad, to encompass both
moral wrongness and choosing an option that is worse than some available alterna-
tive. The threshold view implies that two wrongs make a right, because each of two
options taken separately is worse than some alternative, but taking both options
collectively is better than all alternatives.
Huemer’s objection is that the lexical view is either too restrictive (because it re-
quires us to chase the tiniest risk of a lexically superior outcome), irrelevant to
practical deliberation (because lexical superiority is relevant only when we are cer-
tain), or otherwise paradoxical (because it implies that two wrongs make a right).
I know of one response to this problem in the literature. Crisp (1992) argues that
utilitarians should not try to maximize expected utility. He recommends instead
that we live virtuously. But what do the virtues recommend in this case, and why?
I agree that, in many cases, the virtues may be the best guide to maximizing wellbe-
ing. But there may be at least some cases in which maximizing expected wellbeing
is the best way to maximize wellbeing, both for oneself and for others. This seems
plausible when we know the probabilities of all the possible outcomes, when we
have lots of time to make a decision, and when certain goods (e.g., those associ-
ated with loving relationships or personal projects) are not at stake. And we can
imagine a version of Huemer’s case in which those conditions obtain.
Threshold lexical total utilitarianism suggests a different response. We might call
it
TheWeakThreshold View: There is some probability 0 < p < 1 above which it
would be best to donate to the art school, regardless of the number of people
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aided by the poverty relief organization, and below which it might not be
worse to donate to the poverty relief organization.
Assuming that it’s not wrong (or “inappropriate”) to choose an option that isn’t
worse than one’s alternatives, the weak threshold view does not imply that two
wrongs make a right. The weak threshold view also avoids Huemer’s objections to
the risk-tolerant and risk-intolerant views. The weak threshold view doesn’t imply
that the best option is the one with the highest probability, however tiny, of bring-
ing about some higher good. Nor does it have the risk-tolerant view’s implication
that lexical superiority only matters in cases of certainty.
The threshold view may seem arbitrary, because it’s not clear where the value of p
comes from. But threshold lexical total utilitarians can derive p from their lexical
threshold Δ, which I introduced on page 105. For example, suppose that Δ = 5 on
some appropriate scale for the important dimension. Suppose next that some act A
has a probability p of realizing some important gain of i = 10 (e.g., one masterpiece
produced), whereas B will certainly realize a trivial gain of t = 10, 000 (e.g., ten
thousand itches relieved), and that these are one’s only options and their only effects.
In this case, it’s better to doA as long as p > 0.5: for then p(i) > Δ. Otherwise,A still
isn’t worse, but might not be better, than B.72 Threshold lexical total utilitarianism,
therefore, leads naturally to the weak threshold view.
Huemermight object, however, that theweak threshold view violates the analogous
principle that






Two Rights Don’t Make aWrong: If it is appropriate for S to do A whether or not
S does B, and it is appropriate for S to do B whether or not S does A, then it
is appropriate for S to do A and B.
In the three-charity case, let A = not donating to the first art school, and let B = not
donating to the second art school. The weak threshold view seems to allow us to do
A, considered on its own, and to do B, considered on its own, but not to do A and
B. For if we donate to neither art school, then we miss an opportunity to create a
masterpiece with probability exceeding p.
The weak threshold view does not, however, imply that two rights make a wrong.
For the antecedent is not satisfied in the three-charity case. If we donate to one art
school, then we ought to donate to the other, and vice versa. If we don’t donate to
one of the art schools, then we have no additional obligation to donate to the other
one, but we violate our obligation to donate to them both (or, we do less good
than we can). So we can deny that it’s appropriate not to donate to each art school
whether or not one donates to the other. The wrong is not made by two rights.
The weak threshold view likely faces other objections. And lexical total utilitarian-
ism may generate other problems in cases of uncertainty, beyond Huemer’s objec-
tion. But I hope to have shown that, by appealing to parity, threshold lexical total
utilitarianism is more plausible in cases of uncertainty than the standard version.
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4 Conclusion
I have considered threemanifestations of incommensurability in population ethics:
parity, incomparability, and lexical superiority.
I began by considering critical-band utilitarianism, which appeals to parity. I
found this theory unsatisfactory in several ways: it implies the weak repugnant and
sadistic conclusions and is objectionably ad hoc, because it violates the tradeoff
constraint. I claimed that Broome’s theory, too, is ad hoc, because it predicts
vagueness where we have little reason to expect it.
I, therefore, turned to Bader’s view. Bader’s appeal to incomparability is more ex-
treme but less arbitrary than critical-band utilitarianism’s appeal to parity. But
Bader’s view implies the weak deontic very repugnant conclusion and is subject
to the deontic Egyptology objection. Bader can avoid the latter by accepting inde-
pendence of the unaffected, but that opens the door to a simpler account of the
neutrality of bringing happy people into existence—average utilitarianism—which
avoids the weak deontic very repugnant conclusion.
I suggested that average utilitarianism can eschew sums of wellbeing, gives plausi-
ble results in infinite cases, and is impartial without being impersonal. I suggested
that the other half of the asymmetrymight be obtained either through deontic con-
straints or via asymmetric utilitarianism. The resulting theory says that we should
act in such a way that those affected by our act, conditional on having lives worth
living, live better lives. I concluded that asymmetric utilitarianism is problematic,
but still worth taking seriously.
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I then considered two views that accept the mere addition principle, both of which
appeal to lexical superiority. I argued that lexical total utilitarianism better explains
the repugnance of the single- and many-life repugnant conclusions than Parfit’s
perfectionism. I then suggested that lexical total utilitarians appeal to parity, in
the form of a lexical threshold, to avoid the collapse to strong superiority, to mit-
igate the significance of seemingly marginal differences, and to avoid paradoxical
implications in uncertain cases. Lexical total utilitarianism holds that important
losses cannot be compensated for by any trivial gains. Its violation of completeness
is explained by incommensurable dimensions of wellbeing, in a way that avoids
Broome’s objections to critical-band utilitarianism.
Lexical total utilitarianism, however, is a structural solution to the repugnant con-
clusion. Its plausibility depends on whether a reasonable theory of wellbeing fits
that structure. This makes it a moving target: we cannot always say whether some
implication of the theory is repugnant, because we don’t know what the important
and trivial dimensions are. I have, however, suggested several possibilities that
might yield plausible results. I suggested that lexical total utilitarianism may be
plausible if the things that make life most worth living are combinations of goods,
global properties of lives, discrete or binary properties, and goods that require the
existence of many people.
What I find most attractive about lexical total utilitarianism is its diagnosis of the
repugnant conclusion’s repugnance. The lexical total utilitarian says that the re-
pugnant conclusion is repugnant because it oversimplifies what makes life worth
living. Many philosophers compare the paradoxes of population ethics to Arrow’s
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(1951) theorem in the theory of social choice.73 The solution to Arrow’s theorem,
in the context of social welfare aggregation, is to require more information about
each person’s good: we cannot get by with merely ordinal information about what
each person prefers (Sen 1970a). We need a richer framework of wellbeing. Lexi-
cal total utilitarianism extends this insight to variable-population cases: we cannot
get by with merely scalar information about each person’s good, because no single
cardinal scale can accommodate the complexities of what makes life worth living
and the vast differences between lives of different qualities. On this view, wellbeing
is not like milk, because the dimensions of wellbeing are incommensurable.
I believe that incommensurability can, indeed, help us solve the problems of pop-
ulation ethics, but not in the ways that many have expected.
73See Cowen (1996), Kitcher (2000), and Arrhenius (forthcoming).
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